posted
I have not read all of this yet,it's alot but what i read so far is very interesting.I will read the rest soon,but you guys should read all this in the mean time and tell us what you think.
Part 1
Part 2 and 3 below
Wednesday, March 17, 2010 Timbuktu: The Stripping has Began
It seems that no African heritage barely begins enjoying its belated share of limelight without outsiders [as in people who have no stake in the heritage at hand whatsoever] scrambling hysterically to strip it off its glory, and place credit where it is undue. Timbuktu has not fared any better. The glory of this historical complex has largely been put on the sidelines for quite some time now in the so-called "West", save to hear few metaphoric utterances on occasions of the namesake "Timbuktu", as some fairly remote exotic location, where one is bound to be lost. Again, an example of something positive given a negative spin by folks in the "West". Well, things have turned around a bit recently, with renewed interests in the manuscripts, which until now were in danger of gathering dust and kept in storage in Timbuktu university (madrasa) concerns. This comes in at a time, as reported by various news outlets, when a new museum—sponsored by African and international organizations—is scheduled to be open to the public late in the year. With this renewed interest, so are efforts to strip the historical complex off of its self-earned glory gaining momentum. Just to give an example of this, consider the following piece from a Time online posting, which too makes a note of the aforementioned new museum:
Sitting at a junction of the Sahara's historic commercial routes on a lazy bend of the Niger River, Timbuktu used to be a hectic crossroads where gold traders heading north met herders and salt merchants trekking south across the desert. The city's lucrative trade fueled Mali's empires as well as a rich ethnic blend of black Africans and Mediterranean people, and an intellectual ferment with dozens of Koranic schools. Refugees from the Inquisition in Spain brought their libraries with them, and soon began writing and buying more books. Timbuktu's literary output was enormous, and included works covering the history of Africa and southern Europe, religion, mathematics, medicine and law. There were manuscripts detailing the movement of the stars, possible cures for malaria and remedies for menstrual pain. "I have here my family's whole history," says Ismael Diadié Haidara, whose ancestors carried their books to Timbuktu from Toledo, Spain when they fled religious persecution in 1467, and later wrote and purchased thousands more. "Families which were exiled, which had no country, had their libraries. It was people's security. They could say, 'This is where we come from.' "
On the one hand, the Time extract acknowledges Timbuktu had to have, and in fact, earned its rise to significance, having been the beneficiary of what the article describes "lucrative trade"; its fame was not handed out to it by outsiders as charity—it was hard-earned. And then, on the other hand, the article immediately dives into the idea that "Refugees from the Inquisition in Spain brought their libraries with them, and soon began writing and buying more books." This sleight of hand has the effect of downplaying the home-grown intelligentsia base, that grew in tandem with the rise of the complex, into an international learning center, and overplaying the role of immigrants, in this case European "refugees"; it elicits a misguided notion, albeit in an underhanded way, that these refugees essentially turned the place into a learning center. Hence, the obscuring of the hard-earned and home-grown labor that led to the creation of this heritage is already underway, when the bearers of this heritage have hardly even began to celebrate the new limelight. Sure enough, as an example that the present author can recount from interaction on a social networking site, the article has been greeted with efforts to place due credit to Arabs [compare that to the effort by the Time article to overstate European role], not in one occasion, but at least a couple now. These two cultural-hacking camps place due credit anywhere but where it is actually due: Timbuktu!
The Arab diffusion-cultism attempts to create Timbuktu as a "goodwill charity case" from Arabs. One segment of the associated ideologues gives a one-sided role of being the "giver" in an unequal "trade relationship" of some sort to the "good-natured" Arabs, and the one-sided role of simply "takers" to the "primitive" illiterate locals of Timbuktu. In fact, it has even been bluntly said within this ideological circle, that "they were taught to read and write by Arabs". The underlying message here is that the Arabs "descended on" so-called primitive natives, whom no surprise—were illiterate. Never mind that complexes that had reached international significance had long been in the region prior to the arrival of Arabs, let alone Islam. Never mind that no place has experimented with developing more scripts independently than western Africa, let alone the entire continent. Forget about the fact that Arabic script itself is a handed-down adaptation of a script that has its origins on the African continent! It is a very simple-minded approach to complex historic processes that only rookies at history-telling will take. It doesn't consider the fact that Arabic text was essentially a non-issue in the preceding regional power [to ancient Mali]; the lack of Arab presence obviously did not stop say, ancient Ghana rising to significance in the region, so much so that travelers to the area took note, courtesy of Ray A. Kea (2004):
Al-Bakri gives a description (1068) of the royal capital:
The city of Ghana consists of two towns situated on a plain. One of these towns, which is inhabited by Muslims, is large and possesses twelve mosques, in one of which they assemble for the Friday prayer. There are salaried imams and muezzins, as well as jurists and scholars. In the environs are wells with sweet water, from which they drink and with which they grow vegetables. The king’s town is six miles distant from this one and bears the name Al-Ghaba. Between these two towns there are continuous habitations. The houses of the inhabitants are of stone and acacia wood. The king has a palace and a number of domed buildings all surrounded with an enclosure like a city wall. In the king’s town, and not far from his court of justice, is a mosque where the Muslims who arrive at his court pray. Around the king’s town are domed buildings and groves and thickets where the sorcerers of these people, men in charge of the religious cult, live…. The king’s interpreters, the official in charge of his treasury and the majority of his ministers are Muslims (Levtzion and Hopkins 2000: 80).
While the presence of Muslims, as noted above, was visible in the late periods of Ghana, it had already built itself the reputation as a regional power [as the excerpt below will demonstrate] and a wealthy one. The urban foundations of the elements described had all been in place, which is what allowed for accommodation of new converts to Muslims, with the building of mosques and appointing Muslim sections of the society in administrative posts. These were all possible, because the necessary infrastructure had already been in place, prior to any meaningful embrace of the newly arrived religion, Islam. In addition, Ray A Kea writes:
The Andalusian geographer al-Bakri (d.1094) states that the 11th century rulers of Ghana/Wagadu commanded an army of 200,000 men, 40,000 of whom were archers. It was essentially cavalry-based and the archers were in all likelihood mounted (Levtzion and Hopkins 2001: 81; also Ciss1998: 93, 104; de Grunne 1980). It ensured the centralization of political power and hence the centralization of surplus. Even if the geographer overstated the army’s numerical strength, the numbers nevertheless indicate a demographic order of magnitude that does not refute the archaeological evidence, which, in fact, suggests strong population densities in the Ghana/Wagadu heartland between the 9th and 14th centuries. A further point needs to be made. The maintenance of a cavalry force (military specialists) would have rested on the regular supply of grain for the horses and iron, brass, leather, and other items for the horsemen's equipment (bits, reins, saddles, etc.). These elements, representing secondary distributions of the surplus, required an urban-based commercial economy tied to subordinated communities of food producing and craft specialists.
In fact, Islam was not even adopted by Ghanaian elites who remained true to their local theological traditions for much of its history; it is only in the waning period, does one see any signs of Islam coming into the picture. Fact of the matter is, unlike the situation by around the height of the Malian complex, there was no political or social incentive for adopting either Arabic or Islam, and this would have depended on the relationship the complex had with its main traders, who were largely coastal northern Africans and Sahelian nomadic middle men. Yet, one can hardly be familiar with ancient Ghanaian archaeological record and come to the conclusion that they were illiterate primitives. In ancient Mali's case though, that aforementioned political and social incentive did exist, and so, Arabic as a regional lingua franca was expediently adopted, along with associated scripture, which was introduced to the Malians by their coastal northern African neighbors, not Arabs themselves, in contrast to what the aforementioned ideologues like to say. In fact, as a testament to this geopolitical expediency, the Malian intelligentsia had further locally modified the script into several Malian-specific distinctive forms from the coastal northwest African version introduced to them—with each variant serving a strategically specific social apparatus.
As one website puts it:
The Western style, influenced by the Hijazi script as used in North Africa evolved into the script known as Maghribi, or North African, beginning in the 11th century in North Africa, Spain, and Sicily. Western style script still is used in North Africa. From North Africa [NOT Arabia], this script crossed the Sahara Desert, came to Timbuktu, and spread throughout West Africa where scholars and scribes further developed the script. An exhibit of pages from these manuscripts is available at: Link
Furthermore...
The most commonly used form of script in these Timbuktu manuscripts is Saharan, named for the desert that borders the city. Another form of Arabic script used in Timbuktu is Sudani, which refers to the belt of open farmlands that extends from East Africa to the lands just south of Timbuktu in West Africa. The third West African form of Arabic writing is Suqi–literally the market script. Suqi letters are noticeably square compared to the more elongated forms of Maghribi, Sudani, and Saharan.
Three different scripts were locally developed from the Maghrebian-derived version! These developments don't speak of a "primitive" people blindly going by the guidance of some "master race" of Arabs, who were not involved here nonetheless.
On some winding points here, the site also notes:
Other individuals traveled to Timbuktu to acquire knowledge. It was a city famous for the education of important scholars whose reputations were pan-Islamic. Timbuktu’s most famous and long lasting contribution to Islamic–and world–civilization is its scholarship and the books that were written and copied there beginning from at least the 14th century. The brilliance of the University of Timbuktu was without equal in all of sub-Saharan Africa and was known throughout the Islamic world...
The texts and documents included in Islamic Manuscripts from Mali are the products of a tradition of book production reaching back almost 1,000 years. Although this practice is anchored in the methods of Islamic book production, it possesses features particular to West Africa. The bindings of manuscripts from Timbuktu, and West Africa in general, are unique in the Islamic world. Their decoration with incised markings is in a style characteristic of the area. Further, pages are not attached in any way to the binding–a practice different from all other Islamic manuscripts....
Well how about that? Locally-developed practices of book-making, the only one of its kind found anywhere in the Islamic world.
Continuing on with our reading...
While many books were authored and copied in Timbuktu [Take note: not just "copied", but "authored"], its resident scholars also imported books from other parts of the Islamic world. Therefore, manuscripts found in Timbuktu are often written in Naskh, the most common book hand found in Arabic manuscripts from Egypt, Syria, and neighboring lands. Naskh developed from the Eastern style of the original Kufic script.
These works, whose subjects cover every topic of human endeavor, are indicative of the high level of civilization attained by West Africans during the Middle Ages and early modern period. They are also an important element of the culture of Mali, and West Africa in general, which survived the colonial experience. - Link
The overriding message here, is that Timbuktu's legacy as a learning center is testament to the greatness of Timbuktu, not the greatness of the Arabian peninsula. So, if one were to use the rationale of ideologues of the "Arab diffusion" theory cultism, then since resident scholars of Timbuktu had apparently exchanged ideas with folks from afar, credit of Timbuktu's greatness will have to be parceled out to not only so-called "Arabs", but also Jews, Maghrebians, Egyptians, Persians, southern Europeans, neighboring western Africans, and the list goes on, of the era. Of course, that is not what Timbuktu's reputation as a historic learning center should highlight; rather, it ought to highlight ancient Mali's own home-grown achievement in attaining that global recognition, which brings us back to an earlier point about earning international recognition of significance: Timbuktu earned its reputation as a place of wealth and learning, as any other location would have to go through, to achieve the same. Accomplishment of this feat was therefore not a case of some charity handout from Arabian Arabs, as the aforementioned ideologues would have one believe.
So, worth repeating from the lines immediately cited above, are the following keywords:
Timbuktu’s most famous and long lasting contribution to Islamic–and world–civilization...
Keywords and interpretation: "Timbuktu's", not "Arabs'", contribution to the "Islamic-and world-civilization", and not just Western Sudan, is this:.
its scholarship and the books that were written and copied there beginning from at least the 14th century. The brilliance of the University of Timbuktu was without equal in all of sub-Saharan Africa and was known throughout the Islamic world.
Let's face it; had the coastal Maghrebians been using another form of script other than modified Arabic, guess what? Then, ancient Mali ruling elites, traders and intelligentsia would have likely also used some other script rather than Arabic-derivatives. Given this state of affairs, it is highly misleading to suggest that without Arabic script, the western African region would not have attained high learning and literacy, or that it could not have attained reputation as a learning center. Locally-modified Arabic script forms of Maghrebian type served as lingua franca scripture, facilitating effective trade and social relationships between the discrete groups of coastal northwest Africans, Saharan and/or Sahelian nomadic middle men and the Malian complex residents, and even between the complex ethnic mix that made up the Malian cosmopolitan landscape. To paint this as some simple model of Arabs [who were not even the major players here in the political and trade network] coming in and teaching people to read and write, is at best, a very simple-minded one dimensional way of thinking. The Western Sudanic folks took on the northern African versions of Arabic on their own terms; not a case of some foreign "saints" coming in and teaching some uncultured people how to read and write, as the aforementioned ideological elements advocate. Proof of this, to reiterate, can be intuitive from the fact that grand empires thrived in the region long before either Islam or Arabic-script of any form was embraced by any sections of society! It is more than conceivable, in the case of ancient Ghana, that intelligentsia, political and trade circles used some Saharan lingua franca as a trade language, along with associated script. Evidence of this can be seen from the fact that the Tamasheq communities of this very region have retained the usage of Tifinagh—a Saharan-developed form of "ancient Libyan" script, which itself is said to have partially been inspired by Phoenician letter systems.
For what its worth, below is the presentation of a fairly quick, and hence, by no means comprehensive list of African writing systems—from west to east, and north to south. Africans have experimented with several more, some of which have unfortunately not been preserved through to this day, while others are well hidden from the view of outsiders to what some call "secret societies". In some cases, even the exact age of these writing systems are uncertain; some are reckoned to have been around in remote periods of antiquity. Not too long ago, another form of script—dubbed as "written sub-Saharan language"—was uncovered in Sudan, assessed to be as old as ca. 2,300 years or so. Why this script is singled out as that of a "sub-Saharan" language has not been made clear in news articles like that of the BBC post, being that it has been uncovered in Sudan, also home to the Meroitic text, which has not openly been afforded the same description. One can only surmise that this has something to do with the fact that analysts involved "still don't understand" it, and it is therefore imagined to have come from further south (?) At any rate, a link to the BBC article on the finding is provided in the list below:
Independently invented African scripts?
Eastern Africa:
Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics
Hieratic script
Demotic script
Proto-Sinaitic script
Meroitic script
proto-Ge'ez script [questionably called ESA] and Amharic script
Western African script record:
Ancient Sahara
Tifinagh
Nsibidi script
Bassa Script
Adinkra signs
And more can be found here:
African Writing Systems
And here: African Writing Systems-2
Other African scripts record, the so-called "written sub-Saharan script":
ca. 2300 year old identified "sub-Saharan Script"
And now...
Independently invented Arabian scripts?
None. Just Proto-Sinaitic script modifications, and possibly direct developments imported from the Nile Valley, where the oldest examples of highly cursive Arabic script have been uncovered on papyri.
The aforementioned ideological elements will even go as far as to stare right at the Timbuktu manuscripts, a body of intellectualism and learning of, which to borrow from an earlier citation, subjects that cover every topic of human endeavor, and are indicative of the high level of civilization attained by West Africans during the Middle Ages and early modern period; they are also an important element of the culture of Mali, and West Africa in general, which survived the colonial experience, and yet still maintain that the whole affair is something that is not to be considered as "home-grown science". This is maintained of a region that is home to head-scratching mathematical concepts surrounding Sirius [as we shall soon briefly touch on] and this:
Other individuals traveled to Timbuktu to acquire knowledge. It was a city famous for the education of important scholars whose reputations were pan-Islamic. Timbuktu’s most famous and long lasting contribution to Islamic–and world–civilization is its scholarship and the books that were written and copied there beginning from at least the 14th century. The brilliance of the University of Timbuktu was without equal in all of sub-Saharan Africa and was known throughout the Islamic world..
Notice that books were not just "copied", but they were actually also "authored" therein. How does an area become a cosmopolitan learning center for "subjects that cover every topic of human endeavor", and yet be devoid of "home-grown science"? This is something that the aforementioned ideological elements do not obviously think through. If it is simply all about just compiling "foreign-grown" work, then what is the whole point of people traveling to this "learning center" that could possibly otherwise be considered to be in "the middle of nowhere", just to "acquire knowledge"? Why not simply import the work directly from its source, or yet, go right to that source? Surely, if Timbuktu scholars could import books from afar, then should others not be just as capable of doing the same? Cosmopolitan learning centers don't just pop up in cultural backwaters, now do they! Remember, in the first citation posted here, we were told that: Timbuktu's literary output was enormous, and included works covering the history of Africa and southern Europe, religion, mathematics, medicine and law. There were manuscripts detailing the movement of the stars, possible cures for malaria and remedies for menstrual pain.
Speaking of the movement of stars, let's revisit that aforementioned issue of Dogon astronomy. Citing a posting on Wikipedia, we are informed as follows:
Certain researchers investigating the Dogon have reported that they seem to possess advanced astronomical knowledge, the nature and source of which has subsequently become embroiled in controversy. From 1931 to 1956 the French anthropologist Marcel Griaule studied the Dogon. This included field missions ranging from several days to two months in 1931, 1935, 1937 and 1938[17] and then annually from 1946 until 1956.[18] In late 1946 Griaule spent a consecutive thirty-three days in conversations with the Dogon wiseman Ogotemmêli, the source of much of Griaule and Dieterlen's future publications.[19] They reported that the Dogon believe that the brightest star in the sky, Sirius (sigi tolo or 'star of the Sigui'[20]), has two companion stars, pō tolo (the Digitaria star), and ęmmę ya tolo, (the female Sorghum star), respectively the first and second companions of Sirius A.[21] Sirius, in the Dogon system, formed one of the foci for the orbit of a tiny star, the companionate Digitaria star. When Digitaria is closest to Sirius, that star brightens: when it is farthest from Sirius, it gives off a twinkling effect that suggests to the observer several stars. The orbit cycle takes 60 years. [22]They also claimed that the Dogon appeared to know of the rings of Saturn, and the moons of Jupiter.[23]
Griaule and Dieterlen were puzzled by this Sudanese star system, and prefaced their analysis with the following remark:-
The problem of knowing how, with no instruments at their disposal, men could know the movements and certain characteristics of virtually invisible stars has not been settled, nor even posed.[24]
In 1976 Robert K. G. Temple wrote a book arguing that the Dogon's system reveals precise knowledge of cosmological facts only known by the development of modern astronomy, since they appear to know, from Griaule and Dieterlen's account, that Sirius was part of a binary star system, whose second star, Sirius B, a white dwarf, was however completely invisible to the human eye, (just as Digitaria is the smallest grain known to the Dogon), and that it took 50 years to complete its orbit. The existence of Sirius B had only been inferred to exist through mathematical calculations undertaken by Friedrich Bessel in 1844. Temple then argued that the Dogon's information, if traced back to ancient Egyptian sources and myth, indicated an extraterrestrial transmission of knowledge of the stars.[25] Neither Griaule nor Dieterlen had ever made such bold claims about a putative esoteric source for the Dogon's knowledge.
More recently, doubts have been raised about the validity of Griaule and Dieterlein's work.[26][27] In a 1991 article in Current Anthropology anthropologist Walter van Beek concluded after his research among the Dogon that,
"Though they do speak about sigu tolo [which is what Griaule claimed the Dogon called Sirius] they disagree completely with each other as to which star is meant; for some it is an invisible star that should rise to announce the sigu [festival], for another it is Venus that, through a different position, appears as sigu tolo. All agree, however, that they learned about the star from Griaule"[28]
Griaule's daughter Genevieve Calame-Griaule responded in a latter issue suggesting that van Beek may have been "sent by the political and administrative authorities to test the Dogon's Muslim orthodoxy" and argues that van Beek did not go "through the appropriate steps for acquiring knowledge."[29]
Robert Todd Carroll states that a more likely source of the knowledge of the Sirius star system is from contemporary, terrestrial sources who provided information to interested members of the tribes, or confabulation of new myths by credulous and biased Afrocentric scholars.[30] James Oberg also criticizes the idea that the Dogon tribes drew their knowledge from extraterrestrials, citing instead their extensive contacts with Western explorers, travelers and missionaries as well as members of the French Army, with whom some members of the Dogon served during World War I.[31] James Clifford however notes that Griaule sought informants best qualified to speak of traditional lore, and deeply mistrusted converts to Christianity, Islam, or people with too much contact with whites. [32] Oberg also points out the number of errors contained in the Dogon myths, including the number of moons possessed by Jupiter, that Saturn was the furthest planet from the sun, and the only planet with rings.
Now the reader should keep in mind that Wikipedia citing here is undertaken with a critical eye, as inaccurate information from the site has been identified here before. However, in this case, the material is cited on the understanding that it is fully referenced with footnotes, and hence, making such information fully open to independent verification by the reader, should he/she deem it necessary. That said, let's analyze the above mentioned briefly:
As one can see, the news of Dogon astronomy by two "Western" researchers was first followed up with goofy explanations of how they might have attained this, starting with Robert Temple. After all, how could a "primitive" bunch, with no "Western"-verified documentation of special instruments, be able to come to such advance understanding about a certain element of the universe? As the Wikipedia posting notes, not even Griaule or Dieterlen, the news-bearers of the Dogon understanding, were bold enough to openly come to such conclusions, as that of the extraterrestrial education of the Dogon. Walter van Beek on the other hand pays some community of Dogons a visit, presumably for the sole purpose of verifying Griaule's and Dieterlen's news of Dogon Sirius revelations. An interesting feature of van Beek's findings though, is that it seems to suggest that Dogon only learned of the stars from Griaule himself, some 60 years apart the time van Beek made his visit, which would mean and in contradiction to Griaule's and Dieterlen's revelations of Dogon understanding, that Dogon supposedly had no prior knowledge of Sirius or likely, the other celestial bodies. Yet, this was at a time when even "Westerners" could not figure out the "precise cosmological facts" that Griaule had obtained from the Dogons, having made four separate visits to the latter, followed by a decades long annual visit! One would think that for one, if Griaule had made such a scientific breakthrough, that he would be scrambling to get recognition for it himself, and not some unknown "rural" Africans, about whom they held steadfast prejudices in Europe that very few [Europeans] would have been willing to break away from. And then there is the matter of great detail that Griaule notes of local Dogon lexical names for the stars; did Griaule come up with those names and teach the Dogons said lexicon as well? Going by van Beek, one would have to assume so. The van Beek piece noticeably speaks of only Sigu tolo, which according to Griaule's report, identifies Sirius; yet, Griaule's clearly details not one, but multiple different stars by their Dogon names, none of which can be found in the van Beek piece. These are namely Sigu tolo [Sirius], and its two companions stars: Po tolo [Digitaria star] and Emmę ya tolo [the female Sorghum star]. The van Beek piece does not tell the reader what was to made be of these companion stars.
Furthermore, van Beek's finding has a curious feature: he tells us that Sigu tolo appeared to have varying identities among the Dogon, and yet, proceeds to tell us that they supposedly claimed to have gotten this information from a single individual, Griaule himself! Conventional wisdom should tell us that if that were so, shouldn't the likelihood of the stories being consistent with one another be just as great. If a single source tells two individuals the same story, should the stories of those two individuals therefore not be expected to be that very same story? At very least, what Griaule's daughter, Genevieve Calame-Griaule, said in response to van Beek's charges is likely what is at work here, that "van Beek did not go "through the appropriate steps for acquiring knowledge."" Griaule's visits to the Dogons was extensive. Was the same true for van Beek? Then there is that issue of trust, in acquiring information from Dogon, that James Clifford makes a note of. Clifford informs us that Griaule was very selective about whom he was acquiring information from, perhaps just as careful as the Dogons were likely to be, in sharing their secrets to outsiders; to repeat: Griaule sought informants best qualified to speak of traditional lore, and deeply mistrusted converts to Christianity, Islam, or people with too much contact with whites.
In closing this case study, we are also informed that as superb and as advanced as the Dogon astronomical observations were, they still had a few shortcomings worth pointing out; to reiterate info already cited above, according to James Oberg, whom while not going as far as Temple with the "extraterrestrial" thing, explains off the Dogon intellectual ingenuity as information supposedly "generously" donated by "Western explorers, travelers and missionaries as well as members of the French Army", the number of moons that the Dogons associated with Jupiter were off or erroneous, and so was their estimation of the distance of Saturn from the sun and its description as the lone planet with rings. The funny thing though about James Oberg's explaining away off Dogon knowledge, is that it comes back to full circle with the fact that this was information that the general European public was supposed to have been ignorant of at the time of Griaule's visit; so, how can the ordinary European public [as explorers, missioners or foot-soldiers], whom one would expect to have been in an even worse off intellectual position than European professional astronomers, be expected to teach the Dogon something that they themselves were clueless of? In the end, what does all this tell us? The commotion following Griaule and Dieterlein's reports about Dogon knowledge simply highlights the rigidly held prejudices that Europeans have had about these Africans. "Primitive" people are not supposed to outdo the "advanced" Europeans, or beat them to something as complex as the astronomical specifics described here. The commotion and the conflicting rationalizations of how the Dogon could have attained this impressive knowledge goes to show that European folks have not been able to shake off these long held prejudices. The "anomalous" Dogon intuition simply upsets these prejudices and European-created sense of "racial" stratigraphy.
Then there is another ideological element which sought to answer the Dogon question, as we shall see with other such examples pertaining to Malians, by placing their origins in the Nile Valley, in historic times. All of these rationalizations wittingly or unwittingly converge on a common theme: that "true" western Africans are simply incapable of intellectual creativeness by themselves. It has to be taught to them, or people simply invaded the region en mass with said creativeness.
Amongst the aforementioned Arabic ideological sect elements, the following line of thinking was pushed forth in the heat of debate, from personal recounting: "The math was not developed independently." Given what was just pointed out above, it is clear that this line of argument simply underlies ignorance and the lack of motivation to do basic research. It's premise erroneously assumes that "Algebra" is an "independent Arab invention", and also predicated on the idea that since Timbuktu scholars adopted this form of math, that they were necessarily incapable of their own home-grown mathematical abstract thinking, and that Algebra is the only math known to these scholars. As it turns out, the very personality [some Arab individual going by a pseudonym] who came up with that line of thinking, was not well versed in the actual history of Algebra as a mathematical discipline. For one, he confused the compiler of the first published material with that namesake [i.e. "Algebra"], Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi—a Persian, for an Arab. Now, had this individual done his homework, it would have been clear to him that Persians are very adamant about not being called "Arabs".
Even Persia's Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was a beneficiary of "earlier traditions, most notably Indian mathematics", according the very source used by the Arab personality in question—i.e. Wikipedia. This is how that source put it:
While the word algebra comes from the Arabic language (al-jabr, literally restoration) and much of its methods from Arabic/Islamic mathematics, its roots can be traced to earlier traditions, most notably ancient Indian mathematics, which had a direct influence on Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi; (c. 780-850). He learned Indian mathematics and introduced it to the Muslim world through his famous arithmetic text, Kitab al-jam’wal tafriq bi hisab al-Hindi (Book on Addition and Subtraction after the Method of the Indians).[1][2] ...
The roots of algebra can be traced to the ancient Babylonians,[4] who developed an advanced arithmetical system with which they were able to do calculations in an algorithmic fashion. The Babylonians developed formulas to calculate solutions for problems typically solved today by using linear equations, quadratic equations, and indeterminate linear equations. By contrast, most Egyptians of this era, as well as Greek and Chinese mathematicians in the first millennium BC, usually solved such equations by geometric methods, such as those described in the Rhind Mathematical Papyrus, Euclid's Elements, and The Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art. The geometric work of the Greeks, typified in the Elements, provided the framework for generalizing formulae beyond the solution of particular problems into more general systems of stating and solving equations, though this would not be realized until the medieval Muslim mathematicians.
The Hellenistic mathematicians Hero of Alexandria and Diophantus [5] as well as Indian mathematicians such as Brahmagupta continued the traditions of Egypt and Babylon, though Diophantus' Arithmetica and Brahmagupta's Brahmasphutasiddhanta are on a higher level.
Even the very word "al-Jabr" [from which we get the name "Algebra"], as we can see above, should have been a dead giveaway. It reads: "restoration"—restoration of what? Earlier mathematical traditions, of course, albeit with modifications where necessary! The aforementioned exemplary ideological personality, for what its worth, was hard-pressed to come up with a purely or independently-conceived mathematics by an actual Arab scholar, even as he audaciously points fingers at Timbuktu intelligentsia and charge it with having no home-grown mathematical concept of its very own.
As was the case with Timbuktu scholars, this Persian intellectual simply used Arabic, because it was the dominating regional lingua franca between the different nationalities that became part of the African-interior, Mediterranean confines and "Near Eastern" trade-ring. This was accompanied by the African reinforcement for spreading Islam into southwestern Europe—another testament to just how indebted Islam should be to the African initiative of extending the reach of the religion. Now of course, to get northern Africans to embrace Islam in the first place, engendered long bitter armed conflicts first in the "Near East" and then coastal northern African territories; thereafter, coastal northwest Africa was influential in spreading the religion southward, albeit on western Sudanic terms, as it relates to empires like ancient Ghana or Mali. This doesn't mean that there weren't occasional attempts to force Islamic expansionism on the Sudanic folks, and one sees this at the waning periods of ancient Ghanaian power in the region, i.e. of course, when the complex was reportedly increasingly embroiled with infighting, compounded by natural calamities like drought. Just how accurate is this assessment though? Pekka Masonen and Humphrey J. Fisher (1996) give us a fairly detailed insight on "conquest theories" surrounding the al Murabitun (Almoravids) and the Sudanic folks, in particular—ancient Ghana, in their work "Not quite Venus from the Wave: The Almoravid Conquest of Ghana in the Modern Historiography of Western Africa"; here, we will limit the discussion to a few sections of that work:
In 1974, in an article far too little known, Mahamadou Coulibaly was perhaps the first scholar to attempt an inclusive study of the conquest hypothesis. He began by emphasizing, quite rightly, that al-Zuhr—the source for the conversion of Ghana in 1076—made no reference to any military victory. There is no evidence for the destruction of Ghana, its dismemberment, or any substantive political or military domination of Ghana by Muslim proselytes...
Coulibaly also introduced a new element into the discussion by using the results of the archeological excavations in Tegdaoust (the putative site of Awdaghust) and Kumbi Saleh (the putative site of Ghana) as arguments against the conquest. He correctly pointed out that no indisputable remains of Almoravid presence have been found at either site.
Interesting; but reading on:
In the same year Farias returned to the fray in a review article of Nehernia Levtzion's Ancient Ghana and Mali. Farias argued against the hypothesis in both general and specific terms. He pointed out that it is too much of an oversimplification to think that the relationship between the sedentary Sudanese and the pastoral Berbers would have been constantly violent--as some of the fourteenth-century Arabic and nineteenth-century European sources suggested. Quite the contrary, he stressed the cooperative and symbiotic aspects of their relationship. More specifically, Farias rejected Levtzion's interpretation of the Wagadu legend in oral tradition, with its killing of the sacred snake. This killing might appear to correspond all too well with the idea of a bloody Almoravid conquest of Ghana, the snake myth thus automatically and rashly treated as actual historical evidence. But, said Farias, "the interpretation of the mythical killing as a dramatic representation of an event is not easy to accept."
Indeed, "not easy to accept", especially in the face of no corroborative evidence on the archeological end, or even primary texts dating to the period. Reading on, however...
In the case of the Almoravids and Ghana, this meant that Farias—like Semonin before him—rejected the idea of the destruction of Ghana by the Almoravids in 1076, as manifested by Delafosse. Instead of conquest, Farias preferred to use the term "influence." John Hunwick pursued this line, arguing that the Almoravids did not actually conquer Ghana, but had great influence on its affairs, helping a Muslim faction of the ruling house rise to power.
The evolution in ideas from rejection of the conquest hypothesis to its replacement with "influence" in some circles is noticeable, as intended by Masonen and Fisher through their presentation and references. No doubt absence of compelling evidence has played a role in this evolution, in addition to any prevailing political climate within which these writers give us their piece of mind, that allowed for the emancipation of such investigative thought. "influence" still seems to suggest, albeit tacitly, that some level of coercion or pressure was necessary to account for why ancient Ghanaian ruling circles and folks suddenly converted in the waning periods of the complex, in particular during that seemingly magic year of "1076"; coercion noticeable enough to "influence" the said conversion but not great enough to lead to a violent confrontation between the al Murabitun (Almoravid) and the kingdom of Ghana. Going further...
This idea (Hunwick's version of "helping a Muslim faction of the ruling house to rise to power") had been introduced in 1970 by Jean Devisse, who speculated that the relationship between the new ruler of Ghana and the Muslim population might have changed for the worse after the death in 455/1063 of Basi who had been famous for his friendship with Muslims, eventually causing an Almoravid intervention. Similar thoughts have been expressed also by Daniel F. McCall and Dierk Lange. All this suggests that several scholars were prepared to give up the Delafossean conquest hypothesis, which they realized was indefensible—or at least weak and all but undocumented and the formulation of the "influence hypothesis" was an attempt to give a more reasonable answer to the question: why did the ruler and people of Ghana adopt Islam in 1076?
Good question! And we will seek the answer to it in the next segment of this topic. Please go here: Link Posted by Mystery Solver at 8:51 AM
Wednesday, March 17, 2010 Timbuktu: The Stripping has Began - Pt2 This an ongoing topic, carried from the first posting wherein we came across a question in Masonen's and Fisher's piece, concerning the adoption of Islam in ancient Ghana. That question was, to reiterate:
Why did the ruler and people of Ghana adopt Islam in 1076?
It is a warranted one, since it is generally understood that the religion wasn't widely adapted in that area, and certainly not by the Ghanaian elites, until the waning period of that complex. Indeed, as that singular date seems to suggest, why would the Ghanaian residents adopt Islam all of a sudden, if we are to take away that element of violent confrontation as the vehicle for the conversion? This question elicits even more head-scratching, when the element of that aforementioned idea of "influence" is also ruled out. What does Masonen and Fisher have to say about this? See below:
There seems to us little reason to believe that the Almoravids exercised any kind of determining political influence over Ghana, be it by force or by insinuation. The story of a forceful intervention originated (though it was subsequently much embroidered and enlarged) from the unreliable, for Ghanaian affairs, Arabic chronicles of the fourteenth century and their modern interpretation in colonial historiography. Remove the element of force, and we are left with no reliable peaceful alternative: our sources, even after we have excised the use of force, remain as reliable, or unreliable, as they were before. Furthermore, the hypothesis of Almoravid "influence" or Almoravid support for some kind of Ghanaian coup-d'etat is linked to the existence of a strong Almoravid "southern wing" led by Abu Bakr after the division of the movement in early 1070s. There is, however, little evidence for this: Ibn Idhari and other sources mentioned Abu Bakr's return to the desert and his death there, but with very little additional detail indeed. In fact, the idea of "a southern wing" may itself be understood as a by-product of the conquest hypothesis, the historicity of which requires the presence of a considerable Almoravid force in the south.
It makes sense, in the scheme of things that we have just seen, that the concoction of "a southern wing" is itself a spin-off from the conquest hypothesis. The single-event-invoked date of conversion to Islam in 1076, without some element of overt driving force applied on the Ghanaian folks by the Almoravids, just doesn't seem to sit well by some observers, but the fact as it stands now, is that there is just little in way of actual evidence to support such turn of events. So, do we learn from Masonen and Fisher, of what else then could have triggered Ghanaian conversion to Islam in the waning period of its influence in the region, if not "conquest" or "influence" by the Almoravids? From the said authors:
The reconsideration of the conquest theory received its most radical expression in 1982/83 in a pair of articles by Humphrey J. Fisher and David C. Conrad. They build a rather complex argument on a relatively basic premise: given that Ghana is by far the most often cited name in Arabic writing about western Africa from the beginning to ca. 1500; given that the Almoravids were also a popular topic in this writing, and that often both Ghana and the Almoravids are mentioned by the same author; and given that, despite this interest--sustained over centuries--there is nowhere even a single direct reference to any such destructive conquest of Ghana by the Almoravids as described in the western historiography on Africa, then the logical conclusion seems clearly to be that no such cataclysmic even occurred: in short, "there was no Almoravid conquest of ancient Ghana."
Reaction to this anti-conquest argument has, predictably, been mixed. There was no serious attempt to defend the conqest hypothesis in the 1980s, but the issue resurfaced with Sheryl Burkhalter's article. Burkhlaer strongly criticizes Conrad and Fisher, particularly for ignoring the contexts in which the Almoravids and Ghana are mentioned in the Arabic sources. A little surprisingly, Burkhalter nowhere affirms that the conquest actually took place. On the contrary, her phrasing seems sometimes quite compatible with the anti-conquest case as presented by Conrad and Fisher: for instance, she speaks of "more traditional interpretations of Almoravid history" and of "conventional wisdom concerning an Almoravid 'victory' over Ghana." Her principal objection to Conrad and Fisher seems to be methodological—the problem of individually contextualizing all the dozens of sources which might be expected to mention the conquest, but do not--with some additional condemnation of Conrad and Fisher's suggestions, very subsidiary in the context of their article, about what might actually have been happening between Ghana and the Almoravids if we eliminate the idea of a conquest. Nevertheless, it seems that in the most recent histories of Africa the sceptical attitude towards conquest and destruction of Ghana by Almoravids has achieved a permanent foothold.
Indeed, given the considerable interest and mention of these complexes—Ghana and the Almoravid movement, the total blackout of an armed conflict between the two in contemporary texts of the time simply cannot be ignored. As to last last question posed, we can very well see why Masonen and Fisher fall short of telling us here, what else then could have been taking place in western Africa to bring about Islamic conversion in Ghana; Fisher who is one of our two writers in the present citation, was also party to another "anti-conquest" of Ghana paper back in the early 80s. Therein, they layout what these processes could have been, but then, as noted in the above citation, they were criticized for their "suggestions". The fact of the matter is that there is just not enough in way of specific material that points to one singular event—i.e. non-confrontational—as the main underlying driver for this sectarian conversion, so as to render it unwarranted to extrapolate or speculate to as little degree as possible from what little information is available, of the chain of events that directly culminate into Islamic conversion in Ghana. What is clear from all tangible evidence however, is that violence or any sort of confrontational approach by the Almoravids was not responsible for this conversion. It is to this end, that the present author of this blog is of the mindset that the acculturation to Islam was instigated as political expediency on the part of later Ghanaian ruling elites, having been privy to their progressively declining influence in the region, with which comes the mindfulness of one's susceptibility to known or suspected rivals in the region—be they small or big, complementary to what would have appeared to the eyes of those within Ghanaian ruling circles, the rise of the Almoravids and their expansionist activities in coastal Maghreb and certain areas of the Sahara.
Not to be left out, naturally, is the question that arises out of all this, which is: What then could have instigated the conquest hypothesis? Again, Masonen and Fisher do a decent job of reconstructing the underlying circumstances that provided fodder for the ideology:
One of our principal reasons for surveying in such detail the gradual process of osmosis by which first the conquest hypothesis, and later the criticism of it, have become established in West African historiography was to test the extent to which these changes have been a response to the changing ideological conditions in European thought. We have described in this paper important periods of historiographical transformation which were more or less, we have suggested, ideologically inspired. First there was the Moroccan interpretation of Almoravid history, embedded within Arab and Berber attitudes towards the blacks; both this interpretation and the attitudes were carried over to the Renaissance European literature of Africa. Later there were Europeans' own experiences in early nineteenth-century Africa, which also affected their conceptions of African past. And finally there was the rise of a new science, and a new philosophy to go with it in Europe itself towards the end of the same century, contributing to the new politics of colonialism in Africa, and stimulating changes to the historical record of Almoravid days in particular, calling up the conquest of Ghana as part of this.
What we therefore see here, is Masonen and Fisher disproving the conquest hypothesis and then going onto detail both what triggered and sustained it until it fell out of favor for the more materially tenable position of the "anti-conquest" case. We see that while the conquest hypothesis is a European creation, as Masonen and Fisher admit, the fomenting of the conquest hypothesis is traceable to Morocco some time in the 14th century, as a means to the lay down the foundations for the political and moral justification for seizing strategically-placed territory under western Sudanese rulers, for control over gold trade. This seed was carried onto Europe, as noted above, with writers like Leo Africanus—the Spanish Muslim writer who spent some time in Morocco—being the main vehicle for this; below, note the mention of Ghana in the first paragraph, and then the "mountains of gold" (Jabal al-Dhahab) in the paragraph just prior to the last one of this batch:
According to Leo Africanus, the Land of the Blacks, including Guechet and Cano [Ghana] was first opened up in AH 380/1012 AD, after the arrival in North Africa of a certain Muslim. The Land of the Blacks was then "inhabited by people, who lived like brutes, without kings, lords, republics, government and any customs, and without knowing husbandry." Continuing with Leo's (very North African-centric) account, these blacks were dominated by "King Joseph, the founder of Morocco," referring here to Yusuf b. Tashfin (ruled 1087 - 1106), who established Almoravid power in the Maghreb and Andalusia, and by "the five nations of Libya," meaning the Berber confederacies of the Zenaga, Guenziga, Terga, Lemta and Berdeua. From their Berber rulers the blacks learned "the Islamic law and divers necessary skills, and many of them became Muslims."
Leo mentions the name Ghana only here, without elaboration, and he does not specify whether it was among the lands which were subjugated by King Joseph and the Libyan nations. Neither does the name of the alleged conqueror of Ghana, the Almoravid amir Abu Bakr b. Uma, whom Yusuf b. Tashfin was to supersede in Morocco in the early 1070s, appear anywhere in Leo's pages. There is thus nothing to suggest that Leo Africanus was in any sense a direct progenitor of the hypothesis of an Almoravid conquest of Ghana.
However, Leo's account, consistently placing the blacks under Almoravid rule, was very likely influenced by the far-reaching, and quite unpersuasive, claims of fourteenth-century Moroccan historians, such as that the Almoravids had once conquered the Land of the Blacks as far as the "mountains of gold."
In this respect, Leo himself is more reliable as an indicator of the common negative attitude of Berbers and Arabs towards black Africans, than as a precise historical chronicler. In any case, it is not so much with regard to an explicit conquest hypothesis that the seeds were being sown, but rather in setting a scene of whites over blacks, northerners over southerners, a scene within which the southward penetration of Islam did take place and where such events as conquest might well be imagined.
Furthermore, below we see even more explicit indicators of Moroccan rulers' intentions to dominate Sudanese gold trade in the 16th century than we did from examining Leo Africanus' inspirations for the above-mentioned "domination of northerners over southerners" et al.:
...there is in Marmol's work one reference to southern military campaigning by the Almoravids, where he speaks of "Lumtunas" or the Lamtuna having conquered "Tumbuto" or Timbuktu, and other parts of the western Sudan in a more remote time. This is Marmol's own addition to Leo's description of Timbuktu, which he otherwise repeats as such. The exact source for this rather general campaigning information is difficult to trace; similar commentary was available—as we have already noticed in the context of Leo Africanus—in fourteenth-century Marinid historiography, which was certainly known to Moroccans (and probably to Marmol, too), and of course in the tale of King Joseph and the five Libyan nations.
But it is the context of Marmol's remark, rather than its source, which is of special interest to us—for Marmol was describing here the ambition of "el Xerife Mahamet," or Muhammad al-Mahdi (1544-57), founder of the sharifian Sa'did dynasty of Morocco, to extend his rule further into the Sahara and beyond, "as the Lamtuna had done in the past." Greater control over the Sudanese gold trade would have been important to the new rulers, giving them freer access to trade with Europeans other than the Portuguese, and thus enabling them to circumvent the understandable Portuguese reluctance to see gunpowder and firearms passing into the hands of their potential, and often actual, enemies.
Muhammad al-Mahdi eventually abandoned these plans, but the vital point for us is that once again the history of the Almoravids was being used to provide precedents for contemporary politics and philosophy, and being shaped to meet contemporary needs. Just as the internal requirements of the Marinid dynasty in Morocco promoted the fourteenth-century embellishment of the sub-Saharan Almoravid records, or just as the external needs of an expanding Europe contributed to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century evolution of the full-blown conquest hypothesis, so it seems possible, even likely, that the Marinid elaboration was being refurbished in the later sixteenth century to meet the expansionist needs of Sa'did Morocco, which eventually culminated in the Moroccan invasion of Songhay in 1591.
Masonen and Fisher could not be any more explicit here about the developing theme of their paper under discussion; Europeans initially drew their inspirations from the politics that accommodated Moroccan expansionist designs and that found expression in the works of 14th century Moroccan-based historians, thereof laying down the foundations and early stages of the conquest hypothesis in the 16th century onwards, thus setting the stage for what was to become part of the politics and philosophy for justifying Europeans' own expansionist (colonial) designs in the future. Sure enough, by the 19th century the conquest hypothesis had taken shape, and it was during this same period that Europeans go on their colonial rampage across the African continent, following the infamous Berlin Conference (1884-85) to carve up the continent. The dubious, if not politically calculated, claims of 14th century Moroccan historians with regards to supposed Almoravid domination over bilad al-Sudan (the Land of Blacks) were readily mimicked by European writers, and then given a chauvinistic theme of "northerners' domination over southerners" for the just-mentioned reason—their own expansionist aspiration; Masonen and Fisher point out that this interpretation of events revolving around ancient Ghana and the Almoravids was directly contradicted by records from guess who? Why, none other than scholars from Timbuktu! Read on:
Yet evidence quite contradictory to the Moroccan claims comes from south of the Sahara, from the Muslim scholars of Timbuktu. Muhammad al-Mahdi's attempt to extend his rule into the Sahara and beyond is mentioned also by Abd al-Rhman al-Sa'di, the author of Ta'rikh al-Sudan, which is an invaluable source for Songhay history, and almost contemporary with Marmol. But al-Sa'di nowhere mentioned that the Moroccan claims over western Sudan were affirmed by any Almoravid precedent. Perhaps such justification was not used in this particular instance, or perhaps al-Sa'di edited it out—we can never know--but his silence rather suggests that such a precedent did not exist at all.
Moreover, there is another scholar, the celebrated Ahmad Baba, who denied without hesitation that any conquest of the Sudan by Muslims in the more remote past ever took place--in a document written in 1024/1616 entitled Al-Kashf wa'l-bayan li-asnaf majlub al-Sudan, ("Enslavable categories among the blacks revealed and explained").
Now of course, unflattering caricaturization and prejudice that accommodated the by-now "full-blown" conquest hypothesis in Europe, were increasingly taken to new levels as we approach 19th century colonial expansionist endeavors of European nations, with certain series of events in Europe or involving Europeans along the way chiming in on how some of these prejudices took on their character. For instance, as Masonen and Fisher show, in one case, Almoravids were equated with Saharan nomads—namely the Tuaregs, which came along with negative portrayals of the Almoravids in the Almoravid-west Sudanese historiography, wherein the Almoravids are now not merely part of the theme of "northerners domination over southerners", but also now a vicious, fanatical and savage bunch, to whom the helpless people of bilad al-Sudan had the misfortune of falling victim. No doubt, as we shall see, this had to do with European experiences in the Sahara during encounters with the nomads there:
Mungo Park had already reported that the "Moors"—referring hereto the Mauritanian nomads in general--were "at once the vainest and proudest, and perhaps the most bigotted, ferocious, and intolerant, of all the nations on earth; combining in their character the blind superstition of the Negro, with the savage cruelty and treachery of the Arab. Furthermore, the murders of European travelers in the Sahara—Daniel Houghton in 1791, Gordon Laing in 1881—reinforced the notion that the Saharan nomads considered it to be as "as lawful to murder a European as it would be to kill a dog." There were some travelers, like Henri Duveyrier, who tried to dispel the European mistrust of the Tuaregs, but these attempts were fruitless. On the other hand, the Tuaregs were also respected as brave and dangerous warriors, capable of causing considerable losses to the French army in the Sahara.
Transferred into historiography, this conception meant that the Almoravids of the past appeared quite as intolerant and aggressive as the Tuaregs of the present. In the works of Cooley and Barth this idea is not yet so visible, but it was manifested, especially by Reinhard Dozy in his classic work, Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, published in 1861. According to Dozy, the Almoravid period had meant a severe regression for the prosperous culture of Andalusia, and many scholars followed him in this dismissive judgment. In 1917, for example, the Finnish Orientalist Knut Tallqvist described Almoravid rule in Andalusia thus:
The Berber rule was a serious setback for the Arab culture of Islamic Spain. Compared to the sophisticated Arabs of Spain, the African Berbers were half-barbrians, and though they had adopted Islam, they felt no sympathy towards their Arab coreligionists. It was, therefore, natural that the Arabo-Spanish civilization was not favoured and supported by the Almoravids.
Taking this stance, it was more than reasonable to suppose that the Almoravid influence had been equally disastrous on the southern edge of the desert, too, just as de Slane's translation of Kitab al-Ibar had suggested.
Despite these less than flattering turns for the Almoravid image in European writings of the 19th and early 20th century, there was no let up on the racist typecasting of the people of western Sudan by Europeans, as it continued to serve their colonial designs in Africa. Hence, it is no wonder that what emerges during this period, are conflicting views of the conquest hypothesis; for instance:
On the other hand, the position of Saharan nomads was elevated by the increasingly popular idea of racial hierarchy in European thought. After the elaboration of the Hamitic hypothesis at the turn of the century, the Sahran nomads were counted among those advanced African peoples who had traces of civilizing "white" blood in their veins, being thus superior to the blacks. According to Le Chatelier, for example, the blacks of the Western Sudan owed their progress to contacts with the neighboring Berber race, "more elevated in the normal order of the development of humanity." The Almoravid conquest of Ghana fit well into this picture, according to which all cultural progress in sub-Saharan African had taken place after waves of conquest and cultural influence from the north: by Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Berbers, Arabs, and finally by Europeans. It is hardly sheer coincidence that the more destructive and complete the Almoravid conquest of Ghana became in western literature, the more fantastic the ideas the same writers had on the origins of Ghana. According to Delafosse, for example, Ghana was founded by Jews who had escaped from Roman revenge in Cyrenaica after their unsuccessful revolt in 116 AD.
Writers like Mungo Park and Rene Caillie spoke about "Tuaregs" striking fear in the "Negroes of their neighborhood", but Masonen and Fisher note that:
Besides European travel literature, positive evidence for nomadic superiority was gained from the Arabic sources which stressed the warlike nature of the nomadic peoples. Evidence of the opposite imbalance, with nomads dependent on, or subordinate to, their settled neighbours, was not emphasized by early western authors, but it was certainly not absent, surfacing from time to time.
Furthermore, again despite holding negative perceptions, European writers sought to also give Islam a positive spin to the extent that in the end, it will lend moral justification to European colonial designs overseas:
Nevertheless, later writers went even further in stressing this confrontation. Rene Basset, for example, saw the entire history of Western Sudan as a continuous struggle between the Muslim "white" pastoralists and pagan "black" sedendaries. This view was shared by other French writers. Historiographically this idea meant that the Sudanese empires had been equally helpless against the Muslim invaders from the north, as the Almoravid conquest of Ghana in 1076 (in imagination), and the Moroccan attack on Songhay in 1591 (in reality), proved. Furthermore, emphasizing the historical and cultural passivity of the black Africans gave Europeans a moral justification for their own colonial conquests.
There! The keywords here are: "emphasizing the historical and cultural passivity of the black Africans gave Europeans a moral justification for their own colonial conquests."
Henceforth, recalling the conflicting perceptions of the role of Islam in the conquest hypothesis:
On the one hand Islam, and especially what appeared as Islamic fanaticism, was seen as a barbarous and backward force preventing all modern development—often tantamount to Europeanization—in Asia and Africa. Such a view seemed demonstrated by experiences in European colonies, like the so-called Indian mutiny (as the British called it) in 1857-58 which was attributed to Muslim conspiracy, the revolts in Algeria, and the strengthening in the Sahara of the Sanusiyya brotherhood which was believed to be extremely hostile to westerners. In Western Africa Islamic fanaticism was associated with the contemporary jihad movements which the French believed were opposed especially to their advance in Senegambia and Upper Niger.
From this point of view the conquest (and destruction) of Ghana by cruel Almoravids could be seen as an historical example of the negative impact of Islamic fanaticism, justifying European "protection" in sub-Saharan Africa. The French believed that part of their mission in Western Africa was to save the local black population from Muslim slavery and oppression: for instance, on the Upper Niger they deliberately sought the assistance of the animist Bambara in their fight against Ahmadu of Segu and Samory. We should also notice that historiography had an important role in the late nineteenth-century France in raising the national spirit, and the enemies of France, whether they were fanatic toucouleurs or bloodthirsty boches, could not expect to receive much sympathy from the pens of French writers.
On the other hand Islam was seen also as a positive force in African history. In "darkest" Africa Islam was believed to work as a kind of kindergarten training blacks to receive the blessings of European civilisation. This idea, which strengthened especially in the early twentieth century, after the active colonial conquest was over in Western Africa, was logical, for Islam is, after all, more understandable in European eyes than what passed for African animism. Thus conversion to Islam meant a step up on the ladder of progress: from oracy to literacy, from superstition to monotheism. In this context, the Almoravid conquest of Ghana could be seen as a civilizing act, painful but necessary, giving birth to the sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan which was admired by men like Delafosse and many other French colonial administrators.
And that "sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan" was supposed to have been what? Ancient Mali, perhaps? After all, it is the next major political power in Western Sudan, after the decline of Ghana, and one wherein Islam was embraced. That said, the last paragraph, right above, pretty much sums up the ideological framework of one arm of Arab diffusion theory dogmatists. In the European ideological framework on the other hand, in that it served the conquest hypothesis which was by now accommodated by racial hierarchy in European thought, it fictitiously gave European colonial designs a principled footing—this can't be emphasized enough!
A curious feature of Masonen's and Fisher's article though, is their own mention of "domination of whites over blacks" and "whites" in western Africa, when keeping in mind that the main subjects of the conquest hypothesis happens to be the Almoravids and ancient Ghana, even though much of what they cite in relation to the referenced writers does not explicitly put matters in those terms; for example in one instance, they write that the following about Cooley's questionable interpretation of al-Bakri:
For our purpose here, however, al-Bakri is a strange witness indeed, for he nowhere mentioned the "conquest" of Ghana by the Almoravids in 269/1076-77, nor could he, since he was writing in about 460/1067-68. Nevertheless, Cooley apparently believed that there was after all an account of the conquest of Ghana in al-Bakri.
The key is Awdaghust. An important trading terminum on the southern side of the Sahara, Awdaghust is elaborately described by al-Bakri. Inhabited by Arabs and Berbers, it was clearly in al-Bakri's time a white town, with some blacks among its slaves. But Awdaghust had recognized the authority of the black ruler of Ghana, and this, according to al-Bakri, was the reason why the Almoravids conquered the town in 446/1054-55, treating its inhabitants with considerable severity.
When Masonen and Fisher write that Awdaghust was "clearly in al-Bakri's time a white town, with some blacks among its slaves", on the account that it was "inhabited by Arabs and Berbers", were they making that estimation themselves for that very reason—the mention of Arabs and Berbers, or were they simply alluding to the mindset of Cooley?...for the few excerpts that they directly cite Cooley on, nowhere does he mention anything about "whites" in western Africa? Certainly, even to this day, there is hardly such a thing as Sahel or southern Saharan "white" nomads or local communities. Or else could that description have been used by al-Bakri; if so, does that sound like something that al-Bakri would write out explicitly? They make yet another reference to these "white" southern Saharans here, even though in the very quote that they are citing Ibn Abi Zar, he makes no mention of "white" southern Saharans:
The second was a Portuguese translation of Ibn Abi Zar's Rawd al-Qirtas. Ibn Abi Zar nowhere mentioned Ghana, but he presented a marvelously vivid canvas for the southern Sahara of white triumphalism over blacks and of swashbuckling Islamic adventurers, including the following information about the death of Almoravid amir Abu Bakr b 'Umar:
concluida esta exhortacao, despediu-se Abu-Bacar, e marchou para Sahara, na qual se conservou fazendo a guerra aos cafres de Ethiopia, aonde foi martyrizado em huma das suas gazuas, traspassado de huma seta hervada, de que morreu no mez ce Xaahan do anno 480 (1078), depois de haver subjucato ao seu Imperio o paiz de Sahara ate Iabaledahb (monte de ouro), paiz da Ethiopia, cujos estados revertao depois para Iussof, filho e Taxefin.
Then he [Abu Bakr] bade him [Yusuf] farewell and left for the desert. There he remained for some time waging Holy War on the unbelievers from among the Sudan until on one of his expeditions he was struck by a poisoned arrow and met martyrdom. This was in the month of Sha'ban 480/November 1087 after all the land of the desert as far as Jabal al-Dhahab (Mountains of Gold) in the land of the Sudan had come under his sway. After his death authority became vested exclusively in Yusuf b. Tashfin.
Note that above, "Ethiopia" had been translated into "Sudan" in English.
What's more, is that even Masonen and Fisher themselves tell us later in their article this, recalling a citation provided above:
On the other hand, the position of Saharan nomads was elevated by the increasingly popular idea of racial hierarchy in European thought. After the elaboration of the Hamitic hypothesis at the turn of the century, the Saharan nomads were counted among those advanced African peoples who had traces of civilizing "white" blood in their veins, being thus superior to the blacks.
Certainly, that description by way of implication, is presenting the likes of Almoravids as anything but "white", since the 19th century European writers were equating these nomads with Almoravids, as demonstrated just several posts ago. That being the case, what then to make of that reference to a "white town" in the Sahel? Perhaps, the following may provide answers to these questions, again from a citation already posted above:
Leo himself is more reliable as an indicator of the common negative attitude of Berbers and Arabs towards black Africans, than as a precise historical chronicler. In any case, it is not so much with regard to an explicit conquest hypothesis that the seeds were being sown, but rather in setting a scene of whites over blacks, northerners over southerners, a scene within which the southward penetration of Islam did take place and where such events as conquest might well be imagined.
From this piece, so it appears, that Masonen and Fisher may well be referring to the mindset of later European writers, in trying to portray the conquest hypothesis surrounding the Almoravids and ancient Ghana as a matter of "whites' domination over blacks" and "northerners over southerners", so as to adhere to the "racial hierarchy in European thought", and to justify later European expansionism into Africa. Be that as it may, it is not entirely certain what the authors' intentions may have been.
And of course, the authors go onto demonstrate how Cooley's interpretations of al-Bakri's work must have been off from their original contexts, and even then, they make note of the distinction between the Almoravids and Arabs; see:
Awdaghust had for centuries been a Berber city; this is confirmed by reports from the ninth and tenth centuries. Yet al-Bakri said that this town "used to be the residence of the king the Sudan who was called Ghana before the Arabs entered Ghana." Al-Bakri is our only witness for this royal black residency in Awdaghust. The Corpus editors, rightly observing that al-Bakri is here "far from being clear," and presumably calculating how far back one would have to go in order to predate the first mention of Awdaghust as the residence of a Berber ruler (this is al-Ya'qubi, in the ninth century), suggest that the first Arab entry into Ghana may have been at the time of the Arab conquest of North Africa, in the eighth and ninth centuries.
Already, inconsistencies between Cooley's equation of al-Bakri's "Arab entry into Ghana" by way of Awdaghust to an "Almoravid attack on Ghana" and taking "possession of their territory" thereof, are surfacing. As we shall see, al-Bakri's supposed Arabs could not have been Almoravids, as chronological details will reveal:
Perhaps, that long ago, Awdaghust had indeed been the capital of Ghana. But Cooley, repeatedly and clearly, implies that the Almoravid conquest of Awdaghust was in fact the conquest of the capital of Ghana. This must have been simply carelessness on Cooley's part, for al-Bakri gives us a date for the sack of Awdaghust (1054/55), and he tells us more than once when he himself was writing (1067/68), and both these dates are well before the date traditionally proposed for the fall of Ghana in the "conquest hypothesis," which is the same date (1076/77) that Cooley assigned to the alleged event. Not only are the dates askew, but the entry of the Arabs into Ghana is most unlikely to refer to the Almoravid conquest of Awdaghust, as the Almoravids are nowhere, to the best of our knowledge, referred to as Arabs, in spite of the belief in their Himyaritic origin.
This, the first misunderstanding, is Cooley's own: if his readers followed him in it.
From the above, even a supposed Arab entry to Awdaghust would have predated the supposed sack of Awdaghust in 1054/67, as it would have been traced back to the 8th or 9th century as noted—which is when the Ghanaian ruler would have had residency there, if we are to go by al-Bakri, our only available witness to this, and that 1054/67 event in turn could not have been associated with an Almoravid attack on Awdaghust under Ghanaian rule either, as it conflicts with the forced conversion of Ghana in 1076/77. It makes no sense for an Almoravid attack on Ghanaian capital to take place in 1054/67, cease its territory, and yet not finish the job of conquering, as Ghana continued to be around well into its supposed conquest and forced conversion to Islam in 1076/77 according to Cooley. To top this, Cooley also speaks of the final demise of Ghana by an attack from their western Sudanese neighbors, the Susu, which reportedly should have taken place some time after 1200 AD! Nor should it be forgotten, the fact that the Almoravids were not viewed as Arabs even as far back to their (Almoravid's) era. It is no wonder then, Masonen and Fisher refer to Ghana's fate, going by Cooley's interpretations of affairs, as Ghana's subjection to a "double whammy":
Yet the problem here is that the rulers of Ghana seem to be subject to a double whammy: first the Almoravids assail them, yet they seem to survive for a further century and more before finally succumbing to the Susu, customarily dated soon after 1200 AD. Probably influenced by Ibn Khaldun, Cooley frequently applied dramatic terms to the final demise of Ghana:
"...what were the revolutions, it may be asked, which caused Ghanah to disappear?" (43), "the extinction of Ghanah" (61), and so on. Such doomladen remarks, however, often refer more to the Susu conquest, than to the Almoravid conquest over a century earlier. Cooley himself clearly distinguished between these two events—the religious conquest by the Almoravids and the more political by the Susu--in his summary table...
Indeed, for Cooley was cited on writing this, reportedly through his own reading of Ibn Khaldun's work:
The second flaw concerns the interpretation of Ibn Khaldun's notoriously brief and vague mention of these events, written centuries afterwards—and here the blame may rest more with Cooley'sreaders than with him.
A modern English translation of the relevant passage for instance, is this:
Later the authority of the people of Ghana waned and their prestige declined as that of the veiled people, their neighbors on the north next to the land of Berbers, grew (as we have related). These extended their domination over the Sudan, and pillaged, imposed tribute (itawat) and poll-tax (jizya), and converted many of them to Islam. Then the authority of Ghana dwindled away and they were overcome by the Susu, a neighboring people of the Sudan, who subjugated and absorbed them.
Cooley’s own rendering of the same passage keeps the attention of the veiled people fixed more specifically on Ghana:
The people of Ghana declined in course of time, being overwhelmed or absorbed by the Molaththemun (or muffled people-that is, the Morabites), who, adjoining them on the north towards the Berber country, attacked them, and, taking possession of their territory, compelled them to embrace the Mohammedan religion. The people of Ghana, being invaded at a later period by the Susu, a nation of the Blacks in their neighbourhood, were exterminated, or mixed with other Black nations.
...Two contemporary German texts show how scholars, looking at the available original sources, but uninfluenced by Ibn Khaldun and Cooley's Negroland, could write about events of the eleventh-century Western Africa without mentioning either any Almoravid/Ghana confrontation, or any enforced conversion. In 1842 J. E. Wappaus mentioned the Almoravids and their conquests in the north, but he said nothing of their relationship with Ghana, save the conquest of Awdaghust, which he did not regard as the capital of Ghana. In 1853 Friedrich Kunstmann, citing al-Hulal as quoted in Quatremere's note to al-Bakri, said merely that the conversion of Ghana--from Christianity--occurred in 1075; he made no mention of forced conversion or conquest of Ghana by the Almoravids.
Masonen and Fisher proceed onto illustrate how the period of decolonization in Africa brought in new elements to the conquest hypothesis. It therefore seems that the conquest hypothesis was continuously shaped and modified by new developments and turn of events that filtered into the discourse of politics and philosophy in Europe. Whereas in the periods prior to moves towards relinquishing direct European colonial presence overseas, during which the conquest hypothesis had a firm footing without questioning or any serious challenge directed at it, in the 1960s a new attitude towards the same hypothesis starts to take shape, and it is one that is concerned with challenging the conventional wisdom of the conquest hypothesis, while not initially marginalizing this conventional wisdom in any considerable way. It is only when one gets into the 70s through to the 80s and 90s, does one begin to see challenges posed to the conventional wisdom that have the effect of making a dent in it, and hence, contributing to its marginalization in a serious way. By the mid-90s, the conventional wisdom had been effectively marginalized to a fringe status, but as Masonen and Fisher note, this is not merely attributable to change in the ideological and political climate that writers found themselves; see:
...the gradual and hidden infiltration of the various ideological elements—the identification of Almoravids with Tuaregs, the belief in nomadic superiority, racism, and the ambivalent image of Islam—into the body of research was possible because of the methodological decline of African historiography during the colonial period. The widely-accepted concept that Africa had no history of its own did not mean that interest in the African past completely ceased; it meant that African historiography was dominated, not by academic scholars (such as Cooley and Barth), but by ethnographers, self-taught amateurs, and colonial officers who often worked without any training for proper historical research and were thus more open to the ideological tendencies of their own age, and whose purpose was, after all, to serve the interests of colonial rule.
..But the early 1960s also meant great ideological changes in African historiography in general, as decolonization forced Europeans to change their attitudes towards Africans. The old undervaluation was no longer acceptable, nor was the idea that all progress and change in the African past had been caused by northern invaders. And, finally, we should not forget contemporary methodological development, as African historiography became a respected academic discipline not only in the former metropolitan countries, but also in the former colonies, which were eager to create for themselves a historical identity.
And in closing here with citing Masonen and Fisher, we have:
..It is, we confess, very hard to accept that the changed perception, in the specific cases with which we are concerned (was there an Almoravid conquest of Ghana? and if not, where did the notion come from?), is merely a result of evolving ideology. We believe rather that it is an expression of the methodological progress which has greatly accelerated in the historiography of Africa from the early 1960s, and which is now leading to a new situation in African historical research, with emancipation from the burden of colonial tradition. What is needed is to re-examine early West African history from the very beginning, not by picking out only such evidence as corresponds with the beliefs we have inherited from earlier researchers and which we consider justified as such since it has been repeated for a century, or as corresponds with the attitudes of our time towards the African past; but by using all the sources we have available to us now, textual and otherwise, and by interpreting them without any fixed presuppositions. In this task, we must, if necessary, dare to challenge all the previous hypothesis, even if they have been sanctified by time and repetition.
Yes, change in ideological atmosphere was accommodated by change in research methodology; methodological progress was possible, as the authors above put it, by the release of earlier constraints put on it by "colonial tradition". Furthermore, research is now largely conducted by personalities who have the appropriate credentials, and not left to just ideological sects, amateurs, or mouth pieces of colonial expansionism who are more prone to the "ideological tendencies of their own age".
So this is the bottom line: ...there is no direct evidence for any conquest, still less a violent and destructive conquest, of Ghana by the Almoravids. The conquest hypothesis is a European creation.
Why was this elaborate citation and analysis necessary, surrounding the conquest hypothesis of Ghana? Firstly, Masonen and Fisher's work was well placed for this task, because it provided a rather comprehensive look at a good deal of earlier researchers who contributed to and supported the conquest hypothesis, along with later ones who raised doubts and/or challenged the once held conventional wisdom in European historiographical discourse of Africa. This was done with extensive references and analysis thereof. As we have learned through excerpts of this work, by ignoring the events surrounding the Ghanaian complex and the conquest hypothesis that plagued it for years, one is setting up oneself to being prone to the sort of ideological tendencies that have been ascribed to the Arabicentric and Eurocentric ideological concerns, which by extension taint the origins and the creative legacy of ancient Mali, as we've seen with several examples already. For instance, elements of the mentioned ideologues are predisposed to asking why ancient Malian residents adopted Islam and wrote in Arabic scripture, when they could very well have simply stuck to their very own home-grown counterparts. This sort of question is one that can of course be avoided, if the history of when and how Islam gained footing in Western Sudan took place in the first place, which apparently predates the emergence of the Malian complex in the region. Against this backdrop, it would have been understood that ancient Mali was serving as an outgrowth of the events that were taking place prior to its prominence in the region. Had the issues surrounding when and how acculturation in Ghana towards adopting Islam took off were sufficiently understood by them (ideologues), it would have occurred to elements of the aforementioned ideologues that the adoption of Islam does not herald the beginning of "civilization" in the region by any stretch of the imagination, and all the essential characteristics that are generally associated with the term. Ancient Ghana was politically prominent in the region as a centralized polity considerably long before any embrace of Islam gained ground, let alone the use of Arabic as a lingua franca, and it was wealthy even by the accounts of foreign witnesses. Ghana owed its wealth and growth to the preexisting gold trade with their coastal north African partners, which north African converts to Islam (rather than Arabian peninsula Arabs themselves) would later take advantage of, in addition to intra-western Sudanese trade. This sort of thing does not come about in some unorganized social setting, unbounded by law and order. The Ghanaians were apparently skillful in trade and geopolitical dealings with their rivals and business partners, and had the necessary checks and balances in place to keep internal order within the complex tributary system that made up the kingdom, as well as to secure national sovereignty, all of which in the end is what got them the political prominence that they enjoyed for years upon years before they declined. With such a complex tributary system united by a central administration, surely common sense elicits that there would have been necessary measures to keep an official tab on or record-keeping of productivity in each local, along with the slice of that which had to be turned over to the central administration. As a reminder, Ghana is itself preceded by a number of social organizations in the region; but from listening to Arab dogmatists speak of how ancient Malian adoption of Arabic as a regional lingua franca signals how much the complex owes its greatness—if not creation—to Arabs, one gets the impression that such a development was necessarily preceded by lack of order, social organization, commerce or trade, or urbanization, let alone political consolidation. It elicits the idea that without the Arab role as "goodwill teachers" sent out to teach a bunch of helpless primitive and disorganized "Negroes" of al-Sudan, about the trade of nation-building, a feat like ancient Mali could not have been pulled off by the "Negroes" of western Sudan on their own. Yet all facets of evidence points no role whatsoever on the part of "Arabs", let alone presence, in the lead up to the Mande-oriented Malian movement assuming power and gaining regional prominence, and subsequently onto earning international recognition; it was, quite simply, entirely the handy work from within, of those very "Negroes" just mentioned. It was the culmination of the power struggle that ensued, after the final demise of Ghana by a group that the contemporary texts of the time referred to as the Susu. The Arab ideologues mentioned here, however, want intelligent people to abandon reasoning and dismiss all this, and simply hand them the credit—"them" here, being a reference to "Arabs" as essentially a caste. Henceforth, Arab ideological cultism is no less damaging than the European colonial examples covered here. In fact, if one were to take an earlier citation here, and modify it a little bit, one would be able to sum up their ideological mindset, which quite frankly, is virtually indistinguishable from European colonial mindset:
Here is an earlier excerpt...
Thus conversion to Islam meant a step up on the ladder of progress: from oracy to literacy, from superstition to monotheism. In this context, the Almoravid conquest of Ghana could be seen as a civilizing act, painful but necessary, giving birth to the sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan which was admired by men like Delafosse and many other French colonial administrators.
Merely replace "Almoravid" above with "Arab", and there, we get the gist of the Arab diffusion ideological mindset!
In summing up this segment of the topic, here is the deal: Available pointers suggest that in the 11th century Ghana was on the decline; conversely, the newly emerged Almoravid movement of staunchly devout Muslim-followers was beginning to consolidate its influence in the region In its heyday, it would have been a considerable undertaking to bring that complex (Ghana) to its knees. But even in the periods during which the Almoravid (al-Murabitun) movement was just fomenting its political consolidation in the Maghreb (from al-Maghribi, general Arabic reference to Western Africa, of which bilad al-Sudan and bilad al-Barbar were sub-regional entities), only certain segments of Ghanaian society embraced the religion. Eager to not let the advantages of the trans-Saharan trade network slip by and in the face of Almoravid expansions gaining momentum, it only seemed natural for several Sudanic rulers [elements of which could have had a tributary relationship to the Ghanaian capital or seat of rule at some point or another] to expediently embrace Islam, and forge strong political relationships with this rising Muslim element in the region through the sectarian acculturation. This process had already been set into motion by the time ancient Mali came to prominence in the region, thereby eclipsing whatever remained of ancient Ghana. Therefore, it is no mystery as to why ancient Malian ruling elites embraced Islam from the very onset. Arabic in this period, was to be the lingua franca that facilitated trade and geopolitical ties between the Sudanic complexes and the coastal Maghrebian ones, and also as an anchor for inter-ethnic cohesion internally within the Malian complex. Internal stability is as much a prescription to political success, as is accumulation of wealth through trade. The Malian rulers had a handle on both, giving way to regional political consolidation and prosperity. This prosperity went along with a the growth of its intelligentsia base, as it happens in any other place of the world where economic and political growth is experienced. It is against this backdrop that Timbuktu, being well placed in the trade routes, blossomed into a cosmopolitan learning center.
The use of Arabic as a lingua franca in ancient Mali is of happenstance, for had their coastal north African trade partners not used that language, and instead used another form, then ancient Malians would more than likely not have used it as well. It was a matter of political expediency, that Arabic was adopted, not to replace indigenous languages of course, but for official purposes for reasons already stated above. The complexities of world dealings and what political expediency means are apparently matters that Arab diffusionist ideologues, like almost any cult group, are oblivious to.
With that said, we come to another school of Arabic diffusionist dogma; one that revolves around Islamic and other legends of African societies, cloaked with certain degree of mythology. This will be continued in the 3rd segment of this topic. Go here.
part 3 below
Posted by Mystery Solver at 8:55 AM Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to Facebook Labels: Ancient Ghana, Archaeology, Berbers, Mali, Niger Congo, Nilo-Saharan, Tamasheq, West Africa 2 comments:
Proud Canadian said...
Excellent analysis. What sources are out there that could shed light in depth on the pre-Islamic or Arab genesis of Ghana? April 6, 2010 9:42 PM Mystery Solver said...
Proud Canadian writes:
Excellent analysis. What sources are out there that could shed light in depth on the pre-Islamic or Arab genesis of Ghana?
Unless you have direct access to primary Arabic-written medieval sources yourself, amongst other archaeological particulars [like being a field anthropologist], I'd say that as far as secondary sources are concerned, the works of the McIntoshes [Roderick James and Susan Keech McIntosh] and the mentioned Ray A. Kea were reasonable reads on the background of ancient Ghana. April 16, 2010 8:17 PM
In this segment of the topic, we will examine the other school of Arabic ideologue demic-diffusion theories—this time, revolving around certain African oral traditions or legends. Since Timbuktu is the subject of our discourse here, analysis will mostly focus on allegations made around Malian traditions, with examples from elsewhere on the continent if need be.
We open the set of examples here with a matter that was the subject of an al-Jazeera, the English branch of the Qatar-based media concern, YouTube video posting of a program called "Witness". Al-Jazeera furnishes its YouTube video page with the following abstract, under "Category: News & Politics": Once Timbuktu was known as the intellectual centre for the propagation of Islamic teachings. Now the 'city of knowledge' is witnessing a renaissance. At any rate, at some point in the video clip, the following line was picked up by some correspondent, i.e. an ideological opponent of the present author, in a debate:
"This work is a protection of the manuscripts and our heritage—our Arab heritage. These manuscripts are our history and are very useful for us."
These words were uttered by a woman apparently restoring fragile pages of Timbuktu manuscripts using papyrus paper-technology [another African invention], in what could have been in the company of assistants sent in from Dubai, as she did openly make a note of Dubai's role in assisting with doing just that. There was obviously an English voice-over translation in the video clip, making the audibility of the woman's own words relatively hard to pick up, unless one attentively listened. So, she could well have been saying these things in Arabic. At any rate, the words above, could be an allusion to any number of things, since the words "our Arab heritage" was not clearly defined or elaborated on: It could simply be an allusion to Islamic culture, being that ancient Malian rulers embraced that religion, or even the fact that the manuscripts were written in a form of Arabic script. However, and importantly, nowhere therein, is it claimed that either the woman in the video, or Malians in general are Arabs; this though, is precisely the far-reaching conclusion that the aforementioned debate opponent sought to use the lines for—to essentially suggest that Malians see themselves as Arabs, or extensions of Arabs. And even assuming that this is what the woman in question meant, it goes back to the legends mentioned at the top of this page, passed down generations. Not to diminish the socio-cultural values of such legends, but in many cases, they are essentially tributes to the religious faith that the legend-bearers hold. Hence, certain element of mythology finds its way into these oral traditions, generally revolving around eponymous heroic ancestors, to which the community bearing the tradition ultimately trace their common ancestors.
The mere noting of this condition of culture was visited with sarcastic remarks along the lines of: "You need to go and teach that to those Malians on the clip who are telling you that they are Arabs and if only you could teach that to the writers of those manuscripts." Now, of course, that sarcastic proposition is ridiculous, because it will be like going to all people of different "Abrahamic" faiths, and telling them that biblical eponymous ancestors of say, "Adam and Even in the Garden of Eden", is not an accurate estimation of reality, based on the material findings of science, like for instance, what molecular genetics or human paleontology suggests. Likewise, it is not uncommon to find segments of African societies formulate legends that connect them to some religious eponymous ancestor in some holy land, which could necessarily place that ancestor elsewhere other than Africa. This is certainly true about Islamic African societies. Such undertaking, as that elicited by the aforementioned proposition, will predictably end in the undertaker being written off as "arrogant" and "insensitive". Theological or social constructs like this are best simply left understood as just that—i.e. as religion, nothing more or less, and hence, alleviating the need to bother with trying to convince the bearers of such beliefs to the contrary in one way or another.
Still, ideologues insist that to question legends which were repeated to medieval writers, whom in turn passed them on, is tantamount to charging the message-bearers with not knowing where they came from. For example, on the question of Timbuktu scholars who spoke of legends that place an eponymous ancestor of theirs some place outside of African territory, names like AbdurRahman As-Sa'ad or Mahmud Ka'ati is offered, wherein the former is reported to have said that the Sanhaja and Songhai originally came from Yemen, presumably in his work titled "Taarikh As-Sudan", while the latter is said to have professed that the Songhai, Wangara and the Wakore all came from Yemen, presumably in a work titled "Taarikh Al-Fattach". In what amounts to sloppiness, even something as materially shallow as the following, is offered, having been a product of copying and pasting from some internet site(s):
According to the manuscript number 43 of Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu, the Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir...
What these ideologues refuse to take into account, is that these legends serve a social purpose, which is why they exist in the first place. For instance, every element of society likes to think of itself as the "chosen people" of something that is higher than them or the torch-bearers of the most sacred—a sense of patriotism. Specific sacred or revered eponymous ancestors therefore serve as the bridging element to whatever "end" it is that makes people feel like that they are part of the "chosen ones" or the "sacred ones". These cosmological matters that inspire these myths [surrounding said eponymous ancestors] serve as the divine-sanctioned moral code or law that members of societies are expected to adhere to on their own initiative, in addition to any written out laws of the land written by leaders, which have to be abide by and enforced by law-enforcers. Ruling elites and elements are usually effective in fomenting, if not systematically sustaining, legends from fabricated and/or historical events, that helps them to secure their place in society in the long run. These are usually accounts that date to some remote time long before a group of people formed a distinctive identity for themselves, generally involving time frames unreachable to the target audience that the legends are fed to. As such, it is hard for the average cultural-bearer to test the veracity of the accounts described in the legends, and then, couple this with the systematic repetition of such legends through social conditioning right from childhood. There is generally a misconception among many, that if something is widely accepted, and has been "sanctified by time and repetition"*, then there must certainly be legitimacy to it. Furthermore, many folks fear being considered "outcasts", and so, steer clear from setting themselves up to questioning "conventional wisdom" that could possibly lead one to view the world from a different lens and possibly affect one's code of conduct thereof, which in turn could result in earning one the reputation of an outcast. Again, ideologues tend to take complexities out of issues, and instead look to the most superficial of explanations that could be used to support their preconceived notions.
part 3 It makes little sense to hold medieval writers accountable for information that was passed down generations and onto them; however, they can be tested and held accountable for narratives of a series of events in their own lifetime that they claim to have witnessed firsthand, albeit in consideration of the context of the political and philosophical atmosphere that the writers were working in.
At any rate, to test the veracity of legends, should one choose to avail oneself of such, comparative analysis between different segments of a society can be quite intuitive. To demonstrate this, consider the following, from Richard L. Smith of the Ferrum College, which has been cited here before:
Moving beyond race, language—one of the defining characteristics in the modern concept of ethnicity—is rarely mentioned by classical or Arab authors except to note that their subjects spoke some form of gibberish. This began with Herodotus's offhand remark about the Ethiopian troglodytes: "The language they speak is completely different from any other language, and sounds like bats squeaking,"43 and continues through the sixth-century poet Corippus, who, in referring to Berber tribes, notes that their "barbaric languages bark in savage terms."44 Authors don't usually distinguish gibberishes from each other, nor do they state categorically that language was a major criterion for dividing the peoples of North Africa. Perhaps, however, we should assume this. Tacitus, who falls into the Sallust school in his discussion of North Africa but whose study of the German tribes is unsurpassed in classical ethnography, does refer to the importance of language in his review of peoples to the north of the Roman Empire.45 In other regions of Africa, including nearby West Africa, language has often served as an insignia of ethnicity.
Ibn Khaldun does distinguish the Berbers from the Arabs and other peoples by their language.
According to him, the Arabs gave the Berbers their name, the origin of which meant something like gibberish: "The word berbera signifies, in Arabic, a jumble of unintelligible cries; from which one says in speaking of the lion that it berbère when it utters confused roars."46 *
[46 * - “Histoire I:168. In another place, Ibn Khaldun offers an alternate if similar explanation. According to this, a Yemenite king named Afriqus b. Qays b. Sayfi, who lived at the time of Moses, often raided North Africa and killed many Berbers: "He gave them the name of Berbers when he heard their jargon and asked what that barbarah was." Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. N. J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 14.” - Richard L. Smith]
Richard goes onto say:
The unintelligible cries were the many local dialects Berber was divided into, by one modern count an astounding twelve hundred, although the situation at the time of Ibn Khaldun can only be guessed. And while Berber languages show relatively little internal differentiation in comparison to other branches of the Afro-Asiatic family, a detailed language map of Berber speakers would have the pattern of spilled vegetable soup.47* [47* - “For a background on the origin of Berber and its derivatives, see P. Behrens, "Wanderungsbewegungen und Sprache der früken saharanischen Viehzuchter," Sprache und Geschichte in Afrika6 (1984–85): 135–216.” - Richard Smith]
In the past scholars have tried to get a handle on this so-called "language of dialects" by recognizing two or three dialect clusters—Zanatiya, Sanhaja, and sometimes Masmuda (which, when not recognized as separate, is joined with Sanhaja)—based on phonetic and morphological variations and location. Zanata, Sanhaja, and Masmuda are not terms used in the writings of the ancients but do appear, full-blown, with Arab authors who draw a clear distinction between them. The Masmuda were concentrated in the High Atlas and surrounding areas while in the rest of North Africa the Zanata (those who speak Zanatiya) were more common in the north and east and the Sanhaja in the south and west. The word "Sanhaja" means those who speak Zenaga (Znaga), the major dialect of the western desert. - Richard L. Smith
Then there are legends of ‘Berber’ ancestry, one of which as already very briefly mentioned, is traced back to a personality(s) by the name of “Berr”:
According to the Arabian genealogies, all Berbers are descended from two men: Berr ibn Branes and Berr ibn Botr.79 These two Berrs, although possessing the same name, were not related. From them are descended the great families of Berbers such as the Masmuda, Senhaja, and Zenata. Of all these great families the earliest to spread seems to have been the Masmuda or Ghomara branch. This was followed traditionally by the Senhaja, who today include such varied peoples as the Siwans on the borderlands of Egypt, the Tuareg of the Sahara, and the Braber of the Middle Atlas in Morocco. The third great expansion was that of the Zenata, who were known in Roman times in Cyrenaica, but who did not reach Algeria and Morocco until the Middle Ages. In the thirteenth century these Zenata finally invaded Spain, conquering Arabs and earlier Berbers. One may compare the expansions of the Berber families to those of Kelts, Germans, Slavs, etc. in Europe. - Courtesy of snpa.nordish.net
The present author can only imagine that the website which posted this piece is basing this on Arabic-speaking writers cited in their reference, such as al Bakri and Ibn Khaldun
[More on these sort of legends, from Richard L Smiths analysis:
Unlike Herodotus, Ibn Abi Zar did recognize that his subjects lived in segmented societies,55 but the framework that he and other Arab writers imposed was genealogical rather than anthropological. Groups were defined as descendants of specific people, so exactly who the Berbers issued from was a much debated topic. The most popular starting place was the Holy Land, and first among the candidates was Goliath. After David killed Goliath, the Philistines, frequently confused with the Canaanites, were said to have left their homeland and migrated to North Africa, where they became the Berbers. Not everyone who wanted to keep the Berbers in the Old Testament was convinced of the Goliath connection. One of the most popular accounts goes back to Noah's children, Ham and Sem, among whom Satan was said to have sowed discord:
"Ham, having become black because of a curse pronounced against him by his father, fled to the Maghrib to hide in shame.... Berber, son of Kesloudjim [Casluhim], one of his descendants, left numerous posterity in the Maghrib."56* [56* - “Ibn Khaldun, Histoire I, 177–178. The Ham connection appears in al-Ya'qubi, Corpus, p. 21. The Goliath connection comes a little later in Ibn Hawqal, Corpus, p. 48. Much earlier, in the first century C.E., the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus claimed that the Gaetulians descended from Havilah, the son of Cush, grandson of Ham.” - Richard L. Smith]
Understandably, many of the Berbers did not want their family trees rooted in Goliath, Ham, or other Biblical ne'er-do-wells. Muslims all over the Islamic world often **tried to establish ancestral connections with the Prophet's homeland**, the Arabian peninsula, and the Berbers were no exception. A popular theory among them was that they were long-lost Yemenites.
Ibn Khaldun chronicled all the stories he could find concerning Berber origins and**demolished each in turn**. He characterized one story that featured an invasion by an ancient Yemenite king as an "example of silly statements by historians."57* [57* - “Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 14.” - Richard L. Smith] Nor did he mince words concerning another popular theory:
"The opinion which represents them as the children of Goliath or Amalecites, and which has them emigrate from Syria, willy-nilly, is so untenable that it merits classification as a fable."
But Ibn Khaldun proved more effective as a critic than in offering a viable alternative. In the end he, too, traced the Berbers back to Genesis:
"Now the real fact, the fact which dispenses with all hypothesis, is this: the Berbers are the children of Canaan, the son of Ham, son of Noah." Down this line came Berr who had two sons, Baranis and Madghis al-Abtar. All Berber tribes descended from one or the other of these brothers and were classified as either Baranes or Botr.58* [58* - “Histoire I, 173–185. Also see R. W. Bulliet, "Botr et Beranes: Hypotheses sur l'histoire des Berbes,"Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations36 (1981): 104–116.” - Richard L. Smith]
Continuing…
The Sanhaja were Baranes, and the Zanata were Botr. Further up the tree on the Baranes side were the Mulaththamun, who, according to al-Idrisi, descended from two eponyms, Sanhaj andLamt. They lived in the Maghrib and were the sons of a mother named Tazakkat (Tizki), "the Lame." But Sanhaj and Lamt produced troublesome broods who tried to conquer the other Berbers and were finally driven into the desert, where they became nomads living in tents and surviving on the milk and meat of camels.59* [59* - “Corpus, p. 127.” - Richard L. Smith]
Arab-imposed, male-centered genealogy tells us more about contemporary Arab historiography than it does about Berber ethnography. This is not to dismiss the importance of perceived descent, which was matrilineal among most Berbers, particularly those of the desert. Etymological analysis seems to indicate that this tradition had its roots deep in the past: the words for brother and sister in proto-Berber, for example, are "son of my mother"and "daughter of my mother" respectively.60* [60* - “G. Marcy, "Les survivances juridiques de la parenté maternelle dans la coutume du Maroc Central," Actes du Congrès del'institut des Hautes Études Marocaines (Rabat, 1937), p. 33.” - Richard L. Smith]
Arab-imposed, male-centered genealogy tells us more about contemporary Arab historiography than it does about Berber ethnography. This is not to dismiss the importance of perceived descent, which was matrilineal among most Berbers, particularly those of the desert. Etymological analysis seems to indicate that this tradition had its roots deep in the past: the words for brother and sister in proto-Berber, for example, are "son of my mother"and "daughter of my mother" respectively.60* [60* - “G. Marcy, "Les survivances juridiques de la parenté maternelle dans la coutume du Maroc Central," Actes du Congrès del'institut des Hautes Études Marocaines (Rabat, 1937), p. 33.” - Richard L. Smith]
Arab-imposed, male-centered genealogy tells us more about contemporary Arab historiography than it does about Berber ethnography. This is not to dismiss the importance of perceived descent, which was matrilineal among most Berbers, particularly those of the desert. Etymological analysis seems to indicate that this tradition had its roots deep in the past: the words for brother and sister in proto-Berber, for example, are "son of my mother"and "daughter of my mother" respectively.60* [60* - “G. Marcy, "Les survivances juridiques de la parenté maternelle dans la coutume du Maroc Central," Actes du Congrès del'institut des Hautes Études Marocaines (Rabat, 1937), p. 33.” - Richard L. Smith]
The progenitor of Sanhaja and Tuareg alike was more often than not thought to be a woman, **Tin Hinan** of the Kel Ahaggar being the most well known. Whatever the real story behind the formation of a group like the Lamtuna, a large measure of their self-identity came from the commonly held belief that their eponymous ancestor was a woman named **Lamtuna**, and thus they were related "by blood" to each other.
More on legends, as cited by Richard:
One final aspect of Biblical-based genealogical history is worth noting: it did not start with the Arabs. About halfway through his work, Procopius suddenly announces that it is necessary to tell how the Maures came to Libya. He begins with Joshua and the Hebrews invading Palestine and thrashing everyone in sight. Several of the Canaanite tribes escaped by moving into Egypt, but finding it already crowded, continued on to Libya. Autochthonous people Procopius calls the "Children of the Soil" already lived there; Procopius does not say whether the Canaanites and the Children of the Soil fought or intermarried, only that the Canaanites became Maures.61* [67* - “.V. IV.10.12–24.” - Richard L. Smith] Procopius did not invent the tie between the peoples of North Africa and the Old Testament: for the Christians it goes back to St. Hippolyte in the early third century, but its origins can be seen even earlier in Flavius Josephus and Jewish tradition.62*[62* - “Yves Modéran, "Mythe et histoire aux derniers temps de l'Afrique antique: À propos d'un texte d'Ibn Khaldun," Review Historique CCCIII 2 (Avril–Juin 2001): 327–337.” - Richard Smith] However, Procopius's story does establish a link between portals two and three. It is one of the few strands of continuity, even though it concerns a perceived rather than a real relationship, which brings us back to our original problem: Why does there appear to be such a level of discontinuity?
Richard adds…
The almost complete break in nomenclature between the classical and Arab periods has toraise a few eyebrows. The names we use today come from the sources available to us. Some names originated with the people themselves, as in the case of the Mauri, at least according to Strabo.63* [63* - “Geography XVII.3.2. Later the transliteration became "Moors."“ - Richard L. Smith] Others came from neighbors, and some that ended up in Greek and Roman references were simply botched transliterations.64* [64* - “In the opening paragraph of his discussion on Libya, Pliny complains, "The names of its peoples and towns are absolutely unpronounceable except by the natives," N.H. V.1. See Gustave Mercier, "La langue libyenne et la toponymie antique de l'Afrique du Nord," Journal Asiatique 105 (1924): 189–320.” - Richard L. Smith] Authors confused names probably more often than we suspect. In his tour of the middle of the desert, Pliny notes that "the Blemmyae are reported to have no heads, their mouth and eyes being attached to their chests."65* [65* - “N.H. V.8.46.” - Richard L. Smith] Strabo and others describe a real people they referred to as the Blemmyae, who were nomads living below Egypt. Pliny's Blemmyae, minus the name, were borrowed from Herodotus's discussion of western Libya beyond the cultivated area: "There are enormous snakes there ... donkeys with horns, dog-headed creatures, headless creatures with eyes in their chests (at least, that is what the Libyans say), wild men and wild women...."66* [66* - Geography VIII.7; 135; Histories IV.191.” - Richard L. Smith] Still others were made up by the Greeks and Romans. Diodorus Siculus provides some egregious examples in his tour of peoples living south of Egypt, which includes the Ichthyophagi (fish eaters), Chelonophagi (turtle eaters), Rhizophagi (root eaters), Hylophagi (wood eaters), Spermatophagi (seed eaters), Stnithophagi (bird eaters), and Acnclophagi (locust eaters). Just to show his scheme was not entirely based on diet, he threw in the Simi (flat nosed). It is unlikely that people actually thought of themselves as being Hylophagi or Simi.67* [67* - “.H. III.15.1; 21.1; 23.1; 24.1–2; 28.1–2; 29.1. On names the Greeks gave to the Libyans, see Olivier Masson, "Grecs et Libyens en Cyrenaique,"Antiquités africaines 10 (1976): 49–62.” - Richard L. Smith]
Smith's piece provides with demonstrations of how legends, at least pertaining to one of the examples provided earlier—about Sanhaja and Tuareg origins in Yemen, can be quite questionable, since "Berber" legends vary in their accounts and eponymous ancestors from population to population of Tamazight ("Berber") speakers, if not from time to time. He even provides an example of a medieval writer, Ibn Khaldun in this case, who questioned the veracity of certain legends that he had heard during his lifetime. Of note, which reinforces what was already said about Islamic-inspired legends across Africa, Richard points out: Muslims all over the Islamic world often **tried to establish ancestral connections with the Prophet's homeland**, the Arabian peninsula, and the Berbers were no exception. A popular theory among them was that they were long-lost Yemenites.
Richard's piece also explains how political motives play into legends formulated, some of which even conflict with one another, depending on whom, where and when. Does that mean the historic value of early writers telling these legends should be dismissed altogether, simply because of some political viewpoint they might have held for one reason or another? Of course not; that is just simplistic thinking.
The questions that logically come to mind, for the sake of the subject of this topic--Timbuktu, are as follows:
Given that Islam was not particularly adopted during much of ancient Ghana and times prior in the western Sudan, one would expect that if there is any authenticity to them, that the legends of Muslim communities of Mali would be consistent with those of some of their non-Muslim counterparts. The questions are: Is that the case, and do the consistency of legends align with or structure along the theological-affiliations of the populations, as opposed to ethnic or genealogical connection?
If the eponymous ancestors in the legends of Mali's Muslim communities are authentic, then how come Islam only emerged as a meaningfully embraced tradition in western Sudan near the turn of the 11th century, if not more so in the 14th century. Why did people in ancient Ghana feel the need to convert to Islam only in the waning days of Ghana? If one recalls, we had already covered this question in the last segment, but its purpose here is different. Did Mali's Muslim communities only initially arrive as a genealogically-connected group as late as the 11th century? Even so, how does one distinguish the converts from the non-converts (those who are presumably progeny of the eponymous ancestor who arrived with his/her Muslim traditions), as we know that there were no Muslims communities in the area earlier, but that conversion only starts taking place in western Sudan some time in the 11th century...or are we to believe that *all* Malians were descendants of the eponymous Muslim or Arab ancestor, despite the available records of conversion to Islam? Or yet, could it simply be a *coincidence* that Mali's Muslim communities hold legends that trace an eponymous ancestor to the Arabian peninsula, i.e. if we assume that such an ancestor was not a Muslim but an Arab? Also, recalling one of the references provided by ideologue elements, in their overall effort to support the idea that "Malians ultimately came from Yemen", we were told: According to the manuscript number 43 of Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu, the Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir
With that genealogical background, one would think that Muslim or Arab traditions would have emerged in western Sudan before [or at least, the same time] as the very ethnic groups that claim to have eponymous Arab ancestry. For instance, if it is said that the Fulani derive from an eponymous Arab ancestor in the Arabian peninsula, then the ethnogenesis of Fulani in western Sudan should not predate the alleged arrival period of that ancestor in western Sudan, whether it be evidenced by their mentioning in primary texts of antiquity or through DNA sampling inferences. By extension, if the eponymous Fulani ancestor is said to be in the Arabian peninsula during so and so period before ever arriving in the western Sudan, then it should follow that there should be no historical traces of the Fulani in western Sudan during that same period. To demonstrate the importance of chronological consideration, let's take the following for example, which was brought to the present author's attention by one ideologue sloppily, without a source referenced:
"The Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir who married a Fulani princess of Futa Toro by the name of Madeumaa. From this marriage she had four boys. They are the ancestors of the Fulani tribes: these are the Diallo, Dicko, Sangare, Balde' or Ba, Barry and Diakite".
Well now, attentive reading should make it clear that the "Fulani princess" should not have existed at the time of this marriage event with Uqba ibn Yasir, if we are to assume that Uqba is the reason that such a thing as Fulani exists. In order for this Fulani princess to exist, she would have had to have descended from Fulani ancestry, right?! If she wasn't a Fulani, but just the other ancestor of recent Fulani, then the author ought to have been able to make a note of what her ethnicity was—its name, other than "Fulani", according to the legend.
The following has also been offered to account for the above's shortcomings, and once again we are compelled by its advocate to deal with unsourced references:
Tarikh el-Fettach claims that Askia Mohammed was descendant of the Sîlla, a Soninke clan from the Torodo (the Fouta Toro)
"The woman was a Turudi—the same tribe as Askia...Askia Muhammad claimed to have relatives in Gao and the Toro of Yemen as confirmed to him by the Egyptian scholar Suyuti."
Apparently this explanation does not do much to rehabilitate the one shown prior, for while it seeks to acknowledge the irrationality pointed out about the said one shown prior, i.e. that a Fulani being present at marriage event that was supposed to mark the first stage in the processes that lead to the creation of the Fulani as a people, it suggests that the Fulani derive from Soninke ancestry. This would mean that the Soninke were around before any such group of people as the Fula ever existed; if so, how true would that be? Furthermore, it would imply that Fula, which is generally considered to cluster in the Atlantic branch of the Niger-Congo super-family, evolved from a Soninke language. This has not been demonstrated to the knowledge of the present author. Both questions have been left unanswered by its advocate, for what it's worth.
Now let's examine what genealogical studies involving uniparental markers reveal about Malian folks:
From Woods et al. (2005), here is the rundown of marker frequencies, and we will focus on paternal ancestry, since "Arab" lineage is supposedly assessed through the paternal line, among the Dogon section of Mali's multi-ethnic landscape...
Pretty much all of these are African-specific markers. Hg J, which is fairly frequent in the Arabian peninsula and the Levant is noticeably absent here.
The Dogon only make a segment of the Malian population, and so, these would serve as just a snapshot of Malian overall gene pool. However, given that the Mande-speaking segment makes up the majority, and given the modal markers that characterize such language-speakers elsewhere, it is very likely that these same lineages shown above, are the ones that dominate Malian paternal genealogical landscape, esp. hg E-M33 and hg E1b1a. Hg E1b1b is likely to feature as well, but even more so in segments like the Tamasheq (Tuareg) groups of Mali, whose mtDNA are consistent with those found elsewhere in western Africa. The following comes from Rosa et al. (2007), although it was rather difficult to track the precise source and which segments of Malian populations were involved:
"Haplogroup E1*-M33, of probable local radiation (5–7% in Senegal and Burkina-Faso [2,3,5,7], 40.4% in Mali and 52.9% in Fulbe of Cameroon [1,26]), is surprisingly frequent in Felupe-Djola and Papel (34.0% and 20.3%).
Both ethnic groups exhibit the highest haplogroup diversity (0.5 < D < 0.6) and the deepest-rooting phylogenetic types in our dataset – haplogroups A-M91, E2-M75 and E3*-PN2 – some with occasional occurrences in Fulbe and Balanta ."
And...
"However, the Guinea-Bissau A-M91 lineages do not belong to the widespread A3-M32 but to the A1-M31 subcluster, with reported marginal presence in Mali 2.0% -2,7 , Gambia/Senegal Mandinka 5.1% -7 _and North African Berbers ) 3.1% -1,33-35 ."
_____________________ note- for the above i had to delete the Bracket-Parentheses or i could not post.to see all check out part 3 link below. _______________________________
The A-M91 marker above implicated in Mali was reported in Underhill et al.'s 2000 study. That frequency does not seem to be inconsistent with that reported in the Dogon sample. Clearly, information is sparse on Malian paternal gene pool, but these nevertheless give us a taste of a larger picture.
As for language, our ideological supporter of "Arab" ancestry of Malians was not able to account for why their primary language is not Arab, but sub-phylums of the Niger-Congo super-family, non-Semitic Afrasan/Afro-Asiatic Tamazightand , Nilo-Saharan, with the Niger Congo group of the Mande making up the largest segment of the population, comprising different sub-groups of Mande-speakers.
We are not given the details of what happened to the Malians' original "Arabic" language, or when and how it got replaced by a Niger-Congo sub-phylum, like say Mande.
Ancient Mali was a cosmopolitan complex, and the area remains a fairly ethnically heterogeneous region, as many other African locations usually are; are we to believe that each of these ethnic entities derive from eponymous Arab ancestors, and at the same time, that each of them dropped their Arabic language in favor of all the different western African languages now spoken in Mali? And yet through all this, they can proudly "proclaim to be of Arab heritage" while having some other primary language? Highly dubious, but these are the lengths to which reactionary ideological are willing to take, to obfuscate African history to the extent that they can. As the namesake of this discussion says: The stripping off western Africa of another of its history has begun!
So, what has transpired here thus far? In the first segment of this topic, focus was mainly on the scholarship base of Timbuktu, a one-time intellectual hub in the Islamic world, with its many libraries and world renowned madrasas or universities. Ideological objections to the significance and the local development of this legacy had also been examined, with examples, and correspondingly discredited. With that cleared, we went onto the second segment of the topic, which focused entirely on the emergence of Islam in the region. Naturally, this segment of the discourse had to talk a lot more about Mali's predecessors wherein Islam first took hold, since Mali doesn't herald the beginning of the adoption of Islam in the Sudan of al-Maghribi. The predecessor of note here was ancient Ghana, for a number of reasons. It is during ancient Ghana's era that we first hear about conversion of the people of western Sudan to Islam, it was the regional power of the region and one that predated both the Arab and Islamic presence in the region.
However, the historiography of the coming of Islam during Ghana's time had been heavily tainted by European imperialist aspirations for a long duration of time before things started to change during the era of rapid "decolonization" across Africa and possibly elsewhere in the 60s, and Masonen and Fisher elaborately pursue the genealogy, which they call the isnad, "in the European literature on the West African past, as story passed from scholar to scholar, altering a little each time the baton changed hands—how the [conquest] hypothesis can to be", using a comprehensive body of researchers—past and present—who have chimed in on this hypothesis through the ages, and hence, making their work ideal for analytical purposes herein. In setting "precedents" for "white domination over blacks" and/or "northerners' domination over blacks", in order to justify what would become Europeans' own expansionist desires, European-based writers built on the theme of Moroccan efforts to set precedents for Moroccan expansionist ambitions into Bilad al-Sudan to as far as the "mountains of gold" wherein they could control the trade of gold, as to put them in a better position to trade with Europeans other than just Portugal; setting those precedents was notoriously facilitated through the works of Moroccan historians, who concocted or at least, promoted North-Afrocentric stories or legends about Almoravid conquest of the Land of Blacks - Bilad al-Sudan, even though in this case, no specific mention to Ghana has been reported.
However, while Europeans gradually built on this seed, starting with the likes of Leo Africanus, a Spanish Muslim who had spent some time in Morocco, and who then carried off these North-Afrocentric attitudes to Europe through their writing, the actual and full-blown "conquest hypothesis" involving the alleged conquest of Ghana was that of European creation. European "conquest hypothesis" took on new characters as time went by, and each was influenced by European experiences, be it in Europe or overseas, and it seemed that the more elaborate it became, the more racist or chauvinistic—and even fantastic in some cases—it became, particularly by the 19th century, the period in which much of Europe's colonial adventures in Africa take off in an explosive manner. Thus, the "conquest hypothesis" was characterized by underlying and overt themes of the aforementioned "white domination over blacks" and "northerners' domination over southerners", "Muslims civilizing the animists, and the Christian Europeans then civilizing the Muslims", "Muslims being brutes and savages vs. civilized Europeans as the saviors of Africans" and so on, all of which adhered to racial hierarchy that developed in European thought.
The conquest hypothesis severely hampered the true historiography concerning the western Sudan during Ghana, and hence, also affecting objective accounts for how Islam came about there, such that it would be widely embraced in ancient Mali by both rulers and locals. By ignoring this bit of history predating ancient Malian complex, one is bound to suffer from the same thing that reactionary ideologues suffer from: fabricating myths about how Arabs taught ancient Malians how to read and write, and gave them their Islamic culture, which is ridiculous, as we have seen here, because ancient Malian elites simply carried on what was put in place before their emergence as a regional power, i.e. the embracing of Islam and the use of Arabic as a regional lingua franca, simply because western Sudanese's main trading partners were North Africans who adopted Arabic as a lingua franca. It therefore made sense to continue what was already set into motion before their prominence, and adopt Arabic as a lingua franca. And we have seen, the "conquest hypothesis" attempted to use the fabricated "forced conversion" as "civilizing" agent on the one hand, and as a "fanatical and brutish" endeavor on the other. Of course, aside from being fabrications, neither of them make sense and are just plainly ridiculous, for Ghana was a dominant power in the region before its decline and eventual demise, by not "northerners", "Arabs" or "Berbers" but by rival western Sudanese elements, namely the Susu. No less important, it was a centralized polity made up of tributary system of local complexes with their respective sub-governing systems, and a polity that attained regional prominence and wealth through gold trade that predates the arrival of Muslims.
These are all features of a people who have attained a high state of social development, and hence, not people of lawlessness, lack of governance, husbandry or industry; a centralize polity means that every productivity going on in the tributary units will have had to have systematically been reported back to the central government or seat of rule, which is where writing comes in for recording, and if not, then some other viable alternative with similar effect would have to have been in place. In short: Complexes like Ghana did not wait for Muslims or "northerners" to come to achieve a self-sustaining, socially structured and highly organized society, and there were plenty more highly structured societies in the region before Ghana itself. Mali simply took on the mantle of prominence in the region, and carried over where Ghana left, and the fact that it is yet another western Sudanese complex run by western Sudanese people, not an "Arab" or "European" one, is testament to the fact that no "civilizing" from outsiders was in the cards at any point in time.
It developed wealth sufficiently enough to provide a large base for scholars and intellectuals, both locally and from afar, hence contributing to the Islamic world, what would become one of the best-known learning centers of the medieval era. This legacy though, had been in danger of fading away from the limelight until recently, with the realization that the treasured manuscripts could well have been in danger of disappearing forever, and along with it, a good piece of humanity's history [which is not an option], and that something had to be done to save them and further unlock their secrets—building a museum specially for that, which could be a safe haven for these treasures, and hence relics of both ancient Mali's and western Sudanese legacy.
About Me
Mystery Solver
The internet is obviously an invaluable tool, but it can also work the other way—i.e. comes with certain risks, however far in between. Sparing oneself from potential identity theft or abuse warrants a good measure of anonymity. Hence, the turn towards a pseudonym. This site was not conceived with view to winning blogosphere "popularity contests". Attention-grabbing controversial posturing is out of character here, although it's recognized that many out there do have opinions on any given topic, and that topics which instill polarizing viewpoints may indeed crop up by chance. The overriding goal here is to build a one-stop referential spot for things African, and in doing so, hopefully ease off the flood of misinformation about the continent. Reader commentary isn't restricted, provided that it's done in a respectful insult-free tone. Violation thereof will be met with rejection without reservation. Hope the site proves to be informative to those who care to avail themselves of information gathered herein.
note- for the above i had to delete SOME Bracket-Parentheses or i could not post.To see all check out part 3 link below.
Posts: 2688 | Registered: Jul 2004
| IP: Logged |
posted
Here is some more info about some other cities of early west africa.
quote-
The famed 16th century Arab historian and traveler Leo Africanus recorded: "In Timbuktu there are numerous judges, doctors, and clerics, all receiving good salaries from the Mansa…There is a big demand for books and manuscripts imported from Barbary. More profit is made from the book trade than from any other line of business."
Abderranman es Sadi, a 16th and 17th West African historian and biographer born in Timbuktu, wrote that Abderrahman-El-Teminin, an Arab who returned to Mali with Mansa Musa, "…settled in Timbuktu and found this city full of Sudanese (black West Africans) legal experts. As soon as he realized that they knew more than he in legal matters, he left for Fez, devoted himself to the study of the law there, and then returned again to Timbuktu to settle here."
Even more impressive was the city of Jenne located about 300 miles south of Timbuktu along the Niger River. Jenne had an intellectual culture arguably greater than Timbuktu and moreover their doctors performed advanced surgical operations, such as removing cataracts from the eyes.
In 1655, al-Sa'di, a local scholar who had worked in Jenne for ten years, wrote: "This city is large, flourishing and prosperous; it is rich, blessed and favoured by the Almighty…Jenne is one of the great markets of the Muslim world…Because of this blessed city, caravans flock to Timbuktu from all points of the horizon…The area around Jenne is fertile and well populated; with numerous markets held there on all the days of the week. It is certain that it contains 7077 villages very near to one another."
The renowned West African historian, E.W. Bovill, called that a "convincing tribute" because al-Sa'di was "intensely jealous of the reputation of his own city of Timbuktu, of which Jenne was a rival in both trade and culture."
Jenne was actually very hostile towards Islamic culture and tradition. Unfortunately, due to a 15th century drought, three-quarters of the city was abandoned.
The capitol of Mali, Niani, (population 100,000) located 300 miles southwest of Jenne and 600 miles south of Timbuktu, and the capitol of Songhai, Gao, (population 100,000), and 200 miles east of Timbuktu were also prominent centers of learning in the time of Mali's preeminence.
Posts: 2688 | Registered: Jul 2004
| IP: Logged |
posted
That's a very long article. You should have highlighted the most important piece to the report. What is it about...an unknown white race discovered Timbuktu or a white meditteranean race is native to the Timbuktu area?
Posts: 2088 | Registered: Feb 2007
| IP: Logged |
posted
No,it's not about a unknown race discovered timbuktu and not about a white meditteranean race that is native to the timbuktu area.It's something else. I know it's alot info but i found what i read so far really interesting.
Read has much has you can, you will get the idea or Take your time and read the whole thing .
Read some of it each day or skip days then read more.
Posts: 2688 | Registered: Jul 2004
| IP: Logged |
posted
The Explorer (FYI, the writer of the above blog entry is none other than Egypt Search's "The Explorer") raises some worrying issues concerning the state of Sahelian historiography. I think what's important to realize is that Timbuktu is not desolate. I'm speaking currently, TODAY there are modern scholars from Timbuktu and the general area who are active in retelling their own story. Simply heeding and emphasizing their testimony may blunt some of the erroneous western propaganda.
See book: "Meanings of Timbuktu", with the majority of contributions coming from indigenous African scholars.
posted
I finally finished reading the article and am not surprised at all with what's going on in regards to Timbuktu. I mean what can I say other than the usual diatribe of Eurocentric b.s. or to be exact, Eurocentric Doctrine# 6:
IF IT WAS GREAT, IT MUST HAVE BEEN WHITE: If advanced science, art, or architecture is found in Africa or South America, then Phoenecians, Greeks, Celts, Vikings (or, in the extreme case, space aliens) must be invoked to explain their presence. (Here, whiteness often functions as a relative concept, as "lighter than.") This bias gives rise to a pronounced tendency to date American or African cultures later than warranted, and as a result dating for these regions is constantly having to be revised further back into the past as evidence of greater antiquity piles up.
Of course nowadays in the 21st century this white-washing comes in the form of multicultural melting-pot 'race-mixing'. It's funny how these same Euronuts who love to emphasize refugees from Toledo Spain never mention about the multi-ethnic presence in Islamic Spain to begin with, the large percentage of which consisted of Africans! Now they attribute Timbuktu's greatness to these outsiders! LOL One would think such distorted lies have died out years ago, especially when you have white Western historians and scholars like Marq de Villiers with his book Sahara showing how Timbuktu while originally being a trading post grew to success due to indigenous Malians and related peoples.
Frankly with all the science proving the African nature and connection to Sub-Saharans that so-called 'Mediterranean' North Africans have, I'm surprised they haven't dug up 'Mediterranean' Neolithic ancestors in the region! LOL
posted
Yes, those notes came from my blog. Kenndo, thanks for bringing them to attention.
The "Sigma" guy that posters are harping on on the "Ancient Egypt" side of ES has only reinforced my message above.
Posts: 7516 | From: Somewhere on Earth | Registered: Jan 2008
| IP: Logged |
posted
I read part one which was very very interesting. I like how this report is challenging the flawed knowledge of Westerners where the achievements of African people are being undermined in all aspects from language, written language, mathematics, philosophy, religion and science. I think it is very embarrassing for westerners on their quest to disprove Africa of mathematics they go as far to claim that algebra was introduced to Africans by an Arab when in history and reality algebra was a modification of other mathematical equations that already existed, and it was influenced by a Persian who had foreknowledge from Indian mathematics!! Talking about embarrassing.
The note of Islam being introduced to "west-African-saharan" via North African coastal groups (indigenous I may say) isn't taught enough. People still believe that Arabs traveled through Africa from the east and eventually to the "interior" of Africa to give Africans a religion, language, and writing system when in fact the North part of Africa received Islam before the "interior". That is what I get from part one along with the quest of Westerners attributing the knowledge and history of Timbuktu to Europeans.
Posts: 2088 | Registered: Feb 2007
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Bettyboo: People still believe that Arabs traveled through Africa from the east and eventually to the "interior" of Africa to give Africans a religion, language, and writing system when in fact the North part of Africa received Islam before the "interior". That is what I get from part one along with the quest of Westerners attributing the knowledge and history of Timbuktu to Europeans. [/QB]
The Arabs conquered North Africa in the 7th century
Posts: 43098 | From: , | Registered: Jan 2010
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Bettyboo: People still believe that Arabs traveled through Africa from the east and eventually to the "interior" of Africa to give Africans a religion, language, and writing system when in fact the North part of Africa received Islam before the "interior". That is what I get from part one along with the quest of Westerners attributing the knowledge and history of Timbuktu to Europeans.
The Arabs conquered North Africa in the 7th century [/QB]
^What do you mean by "conquered"? Was there war, and Arabs won.
Posts: 2088 | Registered: Feb 2007
| IP: Logged |
posted
Very informative. Long but worth the read. Great work Explorer.
Posts: 535 | From: From the Darkest of the Abyss | Registered: Apr 2010
| IP: Logged |
posted
Islam's spread has been through both peaceful and warlike means.
In terms of West Africa as far as the Sahel and South go in terms of civilization Islam was introduced and got in stride through Merchants in trading cities and spread before "wars with Arabs" or Berbers.
There were political clashes and religious critiques from outside and within West Africa due to religion, as examples existed within the same civilization of full Muslims and self-described Muslims who were noted as Animist practitioners or still practicing the traditional religions (some Kings were even this to satisfy all sides), as well as nearby full on non-Muslim civilizations. Somewhat, I remember it was suggested that an obfuscating issue was that in many instances people already had cultural practices and ideas in place similar to the incoming religions so they melded with it.
It wouldn't by the way be the first time Paganistic beliefs were melded with an Abrahamic faith -- people often cite certain practices in Europe, but even the Middle East or South West Asia still contains and practices purely cultural traditions that are in fact alien to the raw religion.
Each of the 3 Abrahamic Faiths has influences (including some beliefs) from the outside that would or could be viewed as "pagan".
Posts: 5555 | From: Tha 5th Dimension. | Registered: Apr 2006
| IP: Logged |
posted
Thanks for the encouraging words, folks. It makes writing the articles that much more worthwhile.
I have to have an outlet where I can make sure that my postings here were not in vein, if and when this place finally goes up in smokes.
-------------------- The Complete Picture of the Past tells Us what Not to Repeat Posts: 7516 | From: Somewhere on Earth | Registered: Jan 2008
| IP: Logged |
posted
Except to overwhelm me with embraces,snow amid the summer's green; it was a juniper bush,She turned and followed Harry and Ron out of the clearing and off through the trees,I have a great many defects UGG Boots. I will make holy the Tent of meeting and the altar: and Aaron and his sons I will make holy, http://www.uggbootsoutlet-ie.net He'd slowed to a walkI could only tell because the wind ceasedand I guessed that we weren't far,or the creases in his cheeks so deep,but they are in Falme,Professor Umbridge did not seem to notice the restlessness of her audience.He was barely keeping up with his homework, http://uggbootsclearance-ie.net and we both looked up,Weasley and Miss Granger have proved themselves trust-worthy,congregation of girls of every age Cheap Ugg Brookfield Short,I am sure she will be here presently.When I saw him that after-,says with an air of serious business, http://www.uggbootsstore-ie.com These doubts fretted and harassed him,Whether it was a son who would some day avenge his," the Warder growled.You were ready to give it up to save a friend,Since she had returned to the castle she had not,It was sort of the kiss of death Ugg Classic Tall 5815,Hermione hastily rifled through the magazine under the desk,Harry Potter was a wizard - a wizard fresh from his first year at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry.But my tears dropped upon my breadand-butter,She placed a firm hand on the chest of a teenager grinning at her, http://www.uggboots-outlet-ie.net "Thank you very much indeed,will you get a grip,The only new bit was .And so emerged upon the road towards Kew,said Hermione reasonably Cheap UGG Boots," http://www.uggclearance-shop.net Your mother's coming,Nature taking its course hunter and,and the image of the truth.Harry could see a vein flickering horribly on Snape's greasy temple.
Posts: 138 | Registered: Oct 2011
| IP: Logged |
quote: The identity of the capital city of the Mali Empire is a matter of dispute among historians. Scholars have located the capital in Niani, or somewhere on the Niger, or proposed that it changed several times, that there was no true capital, or even that it lay as far afield as the upper Gambia river in modern-day Senegal. Seemingly contradictory reports written by Arab visitors, a lack of definitive archaeological evidence, and the diversity of oral traditions all contribute to this uncertainty. A particular challenge lies in interpreting early Arabic manuscripts, in which, without vowel markings and diacritics, foreign names can be read in numerous different ways (e.g. Biti, Buti, Yiti, Tati). Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus both call the capital "Mali."
Early European writers such as Maurice Delafosse believed that Niani, a city on what is now the border between Guinea and Mali, was the capital for most of the empire's history, and this notion has taken hold in the popular imagination.Djibril Tamsir Niane, a Guinean historian, has been a forceful advocate of this position in recent decades. The identification of Niani as imperial capital is rooted in an (possibly erroneous) interpretation of the Arab traveler al Umari's work, as well as some oral histories. Extensive archaeological digs have shown that the area was an important trade and manufacturing center in the 15th century, but no firm evidence of royal residence has come to light. Niani's reputation as an imperial capital may derive from its importance in the late imperial period, when the Songhay Empire to the northeast pushed Mali back to the Manding heartland. Several 21st century historians have firmly rejected Niani as a capital candidate based on a lack of archaeological evidence of significant trade activity, clearly described by Arab visitors, particularly during the 14th century, Mali's golden age. In fact, there is a conspicuous absence of archaeological samples of any kind from Niani dated to the late 13th through early 15th centuries, suggesting that Niani may have been uninhabited during the heyday of the Mali Empire.
Various sources cite several other cities as capitals of the Mali Empire, some in competition with the Niani hypothesis and others addressing different time periods. A city called Dieriba or Dioliba is sometimes mentioned as the capital or main urban center of the province of Mande in the years before Sundiata, that was later abandoned.
Many oral histories point to a town called Dakajalan as the original home of the Keita clan and Sundiata's childhood home and base of operations during the war against the Soso. It may have been located close to modern Kangaba. Mande bards in the region speak of the Dakajalan site, containing Sundiata's grave, as sacrosanct. Kangaba became the last refuge of the Keita royal family after the collapse of the Mali Empire, and so has for centuries been associated with Sundiata in the cultural imagination of Mande peoples. If Dakajalan was, in fact, situated near Kangaba, this may have also have contributed to their conflation, beginning with Delafosse's speculation that the latter may have begun as a suburb of the former.
According to Jules Vidal and Levtzion, citing oral histories from Kangaba and Keyla, another onetime capital was Manikoro or Mali-Kura, founded after the destruction of Niani.
Parallel to this debate, many scholars have argued that the Mali Empire may not have had a permanent "capital" in the sense that the word is used today, and historically was used in the Mediterranean world. Rather, authority would rest with the mansa and his court, wherever he went. Therefore, Arabic visitors may have assigned the "capital" label merely to whatever major city the mansa was based out of at the time of their visit. It has been suggested that the name given in the Arabic sources for the capital of Mali is derived the Manding word "bambi", meaning "dais", and as such refers to the "seat of government" in general rather than being the name of a specific city. Such impermanent capitals are a historically widespread phenomenon, having occurred in other parts of Africa such as Ethiopia, as well as outside Africa, such as in the Holy Roman Empire.
quote: Following the death of Sundiata Keita in c. 1255, the kings of Mali were referred to by the title mansa. In c. 1285 Sakoura, a former royal court slave, became emperor and was one of Mali's most powerful rulers, greatly expanding the empire's territory. He made a pilgrimage to Mecca during the reign of Mamluk Sultan An-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1298–1308), but died on his voyage home. After the reigns of three more emperors, Musa Keita became mansa in c. 1312. He made a famous pilgrimage to Mecca from 1324 to 1326. His generous gifts to Mamluk Egypt and his expenditure of gold caused significant inflation in Egypt. Maghan I succeeded his father as mansa in 1337, but was deposed by his uncle Suleyman in 1341. It was during Suleyman's 19-year reign that Ibn Battuta visited Mali. Suleyman's death marked the end of Mali's Golden Age and the beginning of a slow decline.
It is known from the Tarikh al-Sudan that Mali was still a sizeable state in the 15th century. The Venetian explorer Alvise Cadamosto and Portuguese traders confirmed that the peoples of the Gambia were still subject to the mansa of Mali. Upon Leo Africanus's visit at the beginning of the 16th century, his descriptions of the territorial domains of Mali showed that it was still a kingdom of considerable area. However, from 1507 onwards neighboring states such as Diara, Great Fulo and the Songhay Empire chipped away at the outer borders of Mali. In 1542, the Songhay invaded the capital city of Niani but were unsuccessful in conquering the empire. During the 17th century, the Mali empire faced incursions from the Bamana Empire. After unsuccessful attempts by Mansa Mama Maghan to conquer Bamana, in 1670 the Bamana sacked and burned Niani, and the Mali Empire rapidly disintegrated and ceased to exist, being replaced by independent chiefdoms. The Keitas retreated to the town of Kangaba, where they became provincial chiefs.
Mansa Mahmud Keita III
quote: The last mansa to rule from Niani is Mansa Mahmud Keita III, also known as Mansa Mamadou Keita II. He came to power around 1496 and has the dubious honour of being the mansa under which Mali suffered the most losses to its territory.
Songhai forces under the command of Askia Muhammad I defeated the Mali general Fati Quali Keita in 1502 and seized the province of Diafunu. In 1514, the Denianke dynasty was established in Tekrour. It wasn't long before the new kingdom of Great Fulo was warring against Mali's remaining provinces. Additionally, the Songhai Empire seized the copper mines of Takedda.
In 1534, Mahmud Keita III received another Portuguese envoy to the Mali court by the name of Pero Fernandes. This envoy from the Portuguese coastal port of Elmina arrived in response to the growing trade along the coast and Mali's now urgent request for military assistance against Songhai. Still, no help came from the envoy and further possessions of Mali were lost one by one.
Mansa Mahmud Keita III's reign also saw the military outpost and province of Kaabu become independent in 1537. The Kaabu Empire appears as ambitions as Mali was in its early years and conquers Mali's remaining Gambian provinces of Cassa and Bati.
The most defining moment in Mahmud Keita III's reign is arguably the final conflict between Mali and Songhai in 1545. Songhai forces under Askia Ishaq's brother, Daoud, sack Niani and occupy the palace. Mansa Mahmud Keita III is forced to flee Niani for the mountains. Within a week, he regroups with his forces and launches a successful counter-attack forcing the Songhai out of Manden proper for good. The Songhai Empire keeps Mali's ambitions in check, but never fully conquers the empire, their former masters.
After liberating the capital, Mahmud Keita II abandons it for a new residence further north. Still, there is no end to Mali's troubles. In 1559, the kingdom of Fouta Tooro succeeds in taking Takrur.This defeat reduces Mali to Manden proper with control extending only as far as Kita in the west, Kangaba in the north, the Niger River bend in the east and Kouroussa in the south.
Mali Empire and surrounding states, c. 1530
Late imperial Mali
quote:
Mansa Mahmud III's reign ended around 1559. There seems to have been either a vacancy or unknown ruler between 1559 and the start of the last mansa's reign. A vacancy or rule by a court official seems the most likely, since the next ruler takes the name of Mahmud IV. By 1560, the once powerful empire was not much more than the core of the Manden Kurufaba. The next notable mansa, Mahmud IV, doesn't appear in any records until the end of the 16th century. However, he seems to have the distinction of being the last ruler of a unified Manden. His descendants are blamed for the breakup of the Manden Kurufaba into north, central and southern realms.
Mansa Mahmud Keita IV
Mansa Mahmud Keita IV (also known as Mansa Mamadou Keita II, Mali Mansa Mamadou Keita and Niani Mansa Mamadou Keita) was the last emperor of Manden according to the Tarikh al-Sudan. It states that he launched an attack on the city of Djenné in 1599 with Fulani allies, hoping to take advantage of Songhai's defeat.Moroccan fusiliers, deployed from Timbuktu, met them in battle, exposing Mali to the same technology (firearms) that had destroyed Songhai. Despite heavy losses, the mansa's army was not deterred and nearly carried the day. However, the army inside Djenné intervened, forcing Mansa Mahmud Keita IV and his army to retreat to Kangaba.
Collapse
The mansa's defeat actually won Sundiata Keita the respect of Morocco, and may have saved it from Songhai's fate. It would be the Mandinka themselves that would cause the final destruction of the empire. Around 1610, Mahmud Keita IV died. Oral tradition states that he had three sons who fought over Manden's remains. No single Keita ever ruled Manden after Mahmud Keita IV's death, resulting in the end of the Mali Empire.
Manden divided
The old core of the empire was divided into three spheres of influence. Kangaba, the de facto capital of Manden since the time of the last emperor, became the capital of the northern sphere. The Joma area, governed from Siguiri, controlled the central region, which encompassed Niani. Hamana (or Amana), southwest of Joma, became the southern sphere, with its capital at Kouroussa in modern Guinea. Each ruler used the title of mansa, but their authority only extended as far as their own sphere of influence. Despite this disunity in the realm, the realm remained under Mandinka control into the mid-17th century. The three states warred with each other as much, if not more, than they did against outsiders, but rivalries generally stopped when faced with invasion. This trend would continue into colonial times against Tukulor enemies from the west.
The Bamana jihad
Then, in 1630, the Bamana of Djenné declared their version of holy war on all Muslim powers in present-day Mali. They targeted Moroccan pashas still in Timbuktu and the mansas of Manden. In 1645, the Bamana attacked Manden, seizing both banks of the Niger right up to Niani. This campaign gutted Manden and destroyed any hope of the three mansas cooperating to free their land. The only Mandinka power spared from the campaign was Kangaba.
Sack of Niani
Mama Maghan, mansa of Kangaba, campaigned against the Bamana in 1667 and laid siege to Segou–Koro for a reported three years. Segou, defended by Bitòn Coulibaly, successfully defended itself and Mama Maghan was forced to withdraw. Either as a counter-attack or simply the progression of pre-planned assaults against the remnants of Mali, the Bamana sacked and burned Niani in 1670. Their forces marched as far north as Kangaba, where the mansa was obliged to make a peace with them, promising not to attack downstream of Mali. The Bamana, likewise, vowed not to advance farther upstream than Niamina. Following this disastrous set of events, Mansa Mama Maghan abandoned the capital of Niani.
Mali Empire and surrounding states, c. 1625
Posts: 2601 | From: Somewhere | Registered: May 2012
| IP: Logged |
quote: The Batè Empire (N’ko: ߓߊߕߍ߫ Bátɛ) was a pre-colonial state centred on Kankan in what is today Guinea.Founded by Mandinka and Soninke people as an Islamic merchant state in the 16th century, it survived until the late 19th century when it was conquered first by Samori Ture and then incorporated into French Guinea.
Wikipedia.
Samori Ture
quote: Samory Toure (c. 1828 – June 2, 1900), also known as Samori Toure, Samory Touré, or Almamy Samore Lafiya Toure, was a Mandinka Muslim cleric, military strategist, and founder of the Wassoulou Empire, an Islamic empire that was stretched across present-day north and eastern Guinea, north-eastern Sierra Leone, southern Mali, northern Côte d'Ivoire and part of southern Burkina Faso.
A deeply religious Muslim of the Maliki school of religious jurisprudence of Sunni Islam, he organized his empire and justified its expansion with Islamic principles. Toure resisted French colonial rule in West Africa from 1882 until his capture in 1898.
He was the great-grandfather of Guinea's first president, Ahmed Sékou Touré.
Samory Toure Wassoulou Emperor
Wikipedia.
Mandingo Wars
quote: The Mandingo Wars were a series of conflicts from 1883 to 1898 between France and the Wassoulou Empire of the Mandingo people led by Samori Ture. Comparatively, the French faced serious resistance by the Mandinka, as they were able to make use of firearms and tactics that impeded French expansion in the area. The French were ultimately triumphant and established dominance over Mali, Guinea and the Ivory Coast.
Wikipedia.
Wassoulou Empire
quote: The Wassoulou empire, also referred to as the Mandinka Empire, Samory's Empire or the Samorian State, was a short-lived West African state that existed from roughly 1878 until 1898, although dates vary from source to source. It spanned from what is now southwestern Mali and upper Guinea, with its capital in Bissandugu; it expanded further south and east into northern Ghana and Ivory Coast before its downfall.
Wassoulou Empire 1878–1898 Flag Wassoulou Empire at its peak
UBBFriend: Email this page to someone!
![[Smile]](smile.gif)
Printer-friendly view of this topic