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[QUOTE]Originally posted by zarahan- aka Enrique Cardova: [QB] Great stuff Myra. I'll check out those links. Some stuff on the armies of Kongo: ----------- The warrior hosts of Kongo [IMG]http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/05/Kongofighters-buel.jpg[/IMG] The warrior hosts of Angola relied on a relatively open formation, but sometimes deployed central, wing and reserve forces against both indigenous opponents and the Portuguese. The Kongo region (modern day Angola, western Democratic Republic of the Congo, southern Republic of the Congo) exhibits a number of indigenous military systems, particularly by such kingdoms at Kongo and Ndongo. Several outstanding war-leaders appeared in this area, including the redoubtable female ruler and field commander Nyazinga or Njinga. Accounts by Portuguese mercenaries, priests and travellers in the 16th and 17th centuries leave a vivid picture of the native military systems, which often defeated European plans and incursions. Such experiences put paid to the notion (advanced by some Portuguese of the time) that the Africans would be defeated as easily as the Inca or Aztecs by the appearance of horses, guns and cannon.[64] Recruitment, organization and special units. The bulk of the fighting hosts were made of up general purpose levies and volunteers, but most Kongo polities maintained a small core of dedicated soldiers- nucleus of a standing army. Special detachments and commands called lucanzos were also used for various missions, and one such under a commander called Kakula ka Kabasa was defeated by the Portuguese in 1586 when crossing a river.[75] Other special troops sometimes used included elite scouting units, the pombos, who sometimes ran with, and kept up with horses when they were used in the region. The pombos also performed pursuit duties. "Light" and "heavy" troop types were recognized. The light troops were far more numerous, and relied more on individual skill and technique (dodging spears for example). The "heavies" were more disciplined and relied on stronger defensive weapons and formations. A limited number such types operated in the Kongo kingdom, and were armed with shields, unlike other forces. They were reputedly the best soldiers in the country.[76] Tactical units were recognized, from basic sections of 100-125 men, to larger units of 500, called mozengos or embalos. Groupings of these units made up a specific field force that could number up to 15,000 troops.[75] Weapons, battle formations and deployment. As noted previously, Kongo region battle formations were in relatively open order. This allowed the peculiar dodging, twisting and leaping noted in Portuguese accounts as warriors tried to avoid arrows and spears delivered by their opponents. A battle generally opened with a brief volley of arrows from relatively weak bows. Indeed the bravest soldiers went into battle with only a few arrows, which were poisoned in some cases by a potent mixture called cabanzo. Once these were released, the contenders closed for a decision by hand-to-hand combat. Several thousand men could take place in these set-piece battles, and the affair was usually decided by superior skill and aggression. Basic formations were known, and three divisions were sometimes used- a center and two wings. A complex system of drums, horns and signals aided in maneuver of the warrior hosts, and distinctive battle-flags and pennants identified the location of elite troops or their commanders.[75] See the Battle of Mbwila for a detailed example of a Kongo army in action, including the 3-part division of the host, and its use of reserves. Nzinga or Njinga was one of the outstanding war leaders of the Kongo region. Maneuver and logistics. Outflanking moves were popular, with light troops keeping the enemy busy in the center, while the wings extended. In some cases, a reserve force was kept on hand to exploit success, strike at a vulnerable point, or provide a rear guard to cover retreats. Reserve forces were also used as intimidating "stiffeners," forcing the cowardly and faltering back into the battle-line. Portuguese mercenaries sometimes excelled in this role while employed by the Kongo warlords. A Ndongo army attacked the Portuguese at Talandongo in 1583 using this 3-part division, as did the Portuguese force that confronted it. Nzinga also successfully used an outflanking gambit against the Portuguese, breaking their right wing at Cavanga, but saw defeat when her forces paused to loot, and exposed themselves to counterattack.[75] A broken army was usually hard to rally, and often did not reform on the battlefield but melted back to their home villages, to be perhaps reconstituted days later. Once regrouped and rearmed however they could be dangerous, as a defeated Portuguese column found in 1670 at Kitombo. Siege warfare was not highly developed, and most fortified places were only designed to hold out a short period before defenders retreated. Logistical problems plagued both attacker and defender, as the region's war cycle was not set for long campaigns.[75] Fortifications. Angolan armies at times made extensive use of fortifications. In a 1585 campaign against the Portuguese, the Ndongo for example constructed palisaded camps, each a day's journey apart. Use of strong defensive positions on hilltops or in forests was also common, as was the use of fortifications in offensive maneuvers. The Imbangala for example usually built a strong fort in enemy territory to bait opponents into exhausting their strength against it. Some of these positions could be quite formidable, with trenches, parapets, hidden roads, sharpened "punji" stake traps, mutually supporting bulwarks, and covered trenches to protect against artillery.[76] Two-way borrowing and adaptation. Firearms were gradually adopted by the Angolan militaries and used alongside customary fighting implements. Soldiers from the state of Kasanje in the 18th century for example, marched with bows and lances as well as muskets. Their gunmen were considered to be the equal of the Portuguese in competence.[77] While Portuguese mercenaries and armies armed with muskets made a substantial showing in military terms, it was only until the end of the 18th century than indigenous forces incorporated them on a large scale. Other gunpowder weapons like artillery served the Portuguese well in breaking up enemy attacks or against fortifications. African systems like that of Kongo also gradually adopted artillery though on a much more limited scale[78] Ironically the Portuguese were sometimes more effective because of non-firearm weapons, such as body armor, swords and pikes. The exchange of techniques and approaches was not always one way. While the Kongo kingdoms gradually adopted European technology, the Portuguese themselves borrowed and adapted African war practices to make themselves more effective against their opponents. In one engagement, the Battle of Kitombo, in 1670, the Portuguese armed themselves with native shields, hoping to demonstrate their prowess with these and their swords.[79] The Portuguese adopted some indigenous practices such as the use of quilted cotton armor, proof against arrows and light spears.[80] They also drew heavily on native allies, keeping a small nucleus of European troops, and a large body of indigenous warriors- with each force fighting in its own style. This is similar to the Kongo use of allied forces. The Europeans also adopted the looser formation of the native armies, discarding rigid squares of musketeers for more maneuverable and flexible configurations.[75] ....... Outside technology was not the decisive factor in many conflicts. Major European ships for example were unimpressive in the shallow waters close to shore. Likewise European artillery while of unmistakable value in siege operations against well articulated structures such as gates and walls, were of limited utility against well placed African earthworks. European muskets greatly increased killing power but their slow-rate of fire rendered musketeers vulnerable to the quick charges or arrow volleys of motivated opponents. Angola serves as a test bed in many ways for outside technology in African warfare, and the Portuguese attempted direct conquest with their own weapons, including the use of heavy body armor. However the record shows several Portuguese defeats, and in numerous cases where the Portuguese attempted to fight unsupported by African allies they were liquidated on the field of battle.[96] [/QB][/QUOTE]
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