posted
# The program started with the issuance of law 203 of 1991, which establishes the regulatory framework for the sale of shares and assets of 314 public enterprises affiliated to 10 Holding Companies. The law allows the sale of public enterprises to private sector investors and does not preclude purchase of assets by foreigners. # Out of the original portfolio of 314 companies, the government has sold majority interests in 167 and minority interests in another 18. # As of December 2001, the total privatization program involved the sale of interests in 185 companies, bringing in proceeds worth LE16.8 billion, representing some 4.4% of GDP. # Companies privatized were diversified over a number of sectors including agricultural, real estate and construction, food and beverages, milling, pharmaceuticals, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, engineering, retail, textiles, housing and tourism and telecommunications. # In addition to Law 203 companies, the government is committed to the sale of its outstanding stakes in 511 Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) according to Presidential Decree 341 of 1996 to reform and reconstruct JVCs through privatization. This includes both state and joint venture banks and insurance companies. ------------------------------------------------ - Egyptians : are you with or against Privatization in egypt ? and why ?
- Foreigners : what's your idea of Privatization? and was there a similar strategy in your country? was it successful?
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you must have private companies you will find with the new laws comong in to affect in your country will benifit all and the main thing here is to attract new investment from abroad
Posts: 1344 | From: uk/ | Registered: Mar 2006
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quote:Originally posted by Ichigo: # The program started with the issuance of law 203 of 1991, which establishes the regulatory framework for the sale of shares and assets of 314 public enterprises affiliated to 10 Holding Companies. The law allows the sale of public enterprises to private sector investors and does not preclude purchase of assets by foreigners. # Out of the original portfolio of 314 companies, the government has sold majority interests in 167 and minority interests in another 18. # As of December 2001, the total privatization program involved the sale of interests in 185 companies, bringing in proceeds worth LE16.8 billion, representing some 4.4% of GDP. # Companies privatized were diversified over a number of sectors including agricultural, real estate and construction, food and beverages, milling, pharmaceuticals, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, engineering, retail, textiles, housing and tourism and telecommunications. # In addition to Law 203 companies, the government is committed to the sale of its outstanding stakes in 511 Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) according to Presidential Decree 341 of 1996 to reform and reconstruct JVCs through privatization. This includes both state and joint venture banks and insurance companies.
The simple answer is that I'm against but the subject is quite complex. The problem has to do with how, when and where privatization takes place and if there are any limitation on it.
As far as Egypt is concerned privatization ends up helping the multinational corporations not Egyptians. It gives the false impression of cutting "fat" and giving jobs to Egyptians but in fact the opposite happens.
Whenever you allow rich corporation to enter the market the smaller companies with limited resources are driven out of business because the simply can not compete.
The way to do it is to attach conditions to make sure that foreign corporations locally manufacture at leas part of the products they intend to sell. But what usually happens is that a company would but out a manufacturing plant, shut it down and then sell their products which is manufactured somewhere else in the world. In other words they're only interested in the market and removing competition. Of course if your labor is cheep and your labor laws are non exisitent then they are more than happy to take adantage of that.
Bear in mind that Egypt is privatizing while under pressure by the IMF in order to reduce the debt even though the debt to GDP ratio is quite reasonable. The IMF is the tool the Multi-National corporations use to force the poorer countries to sell their own resources and assets foreigners.
This has been happening in Canada for decades and now the country is owned by US corporations. They have lost control of everything including the Canadian Dollar.Believe it or not, the Canadian government is NOT allowed to print it's own currency.
*sorry to long a subject to be able to cover it properly, but you get the jest*
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is there an equivalent to the monopolies and mergers commission?
Posts: 5642 | From: hellonearth.myfastforum.org Forum Index | Registered: Feb 2006
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Organized Crime : yes Sadat tried but for another reason. Sadat was trying to eliminate the cummunists in egypt ( their ideology ) and in the same time to bring the underground economy to the surface ( Drugs , illegal/legal Non-taxed business ).
Automatic For The People : I totally agree with you and sure it's a complicated matter. But considering privatization was Egypt last hope for economic reform do you think there was any way out?
Some of the results published by Egypt business consultants :
Dynamic new cabinet appointed: In July 2004, a new cabinet was appointed. The new cabinet includes several outspoken advocates of reform who understand and appreciate the private sector.
Customs reforms and tariff reductions: In September 2004, a decree was passed aiming at simplifying customs procedures and cutting the average tariff rate from 14.6% down to 9% on around 6,500 imported items. The decision also reduced the number of tariff bands from 27 to six, and canceled all imports customs service fees, which ranged between 1% and 4%.
Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchanges (CASE): In 2004, the Egyptian stock market experienced several booms. The CASE 30 Index reached 2568 points, recording an unprecedented 119-percent increase. Egypt ranked second on the S&P/IFCG indicator, with 100.5 percent annual change, and first on the S&P/IFCI indicator with 118.6 percent annual change. It also ranked second on the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index, with 114.6 percent annual change.
Egyptian National Competitiveness Council (ENCC): In February 2004, the creation of the Egyptian National Competitiveness Council (ENCC) was announced at the Davos meeting of the Arab Business Council.
Egypt removed from money laundering blacklist: In February 2004, the OECD Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international body leading the campaign against money laundering, announced the removal of Egypt from its list of non-compliant countries.
Managed Float currency system: In January 2003, policymakers abandoned the currencys managed-peg system in favor of a managed float system. The move led to an approximate 36-percent year-on-year devaluation of the Egyptian pound. Egypt is one of the few countries in the region to adopt a floating exchange rate.
Bank management and corporate Governance: Under the governments ongoing reform strategy, bankers with private sector experience have been appointed to head Egypt as biggest state banks. The CBE has issued guidelines for the formation and functions of audit committees in all licensed banks.
Agricultural sector: The domestic agriculture industry has undergone significant reform over the past decade. Today, all agricultural land is in the hands of private owners.
Petroleum industry: The liberalization of this vital sector has resulted in the deregulation of gas distribution. Currently, some 80 percent of all oil and gas services are operated by the private sector, with 90 percent of all exploration activities carried out by multinationals.
Telecommunication sector: The government decided from the outset to award telecom GSM licenses to the private sector, awarding two contracts to private operators. Additionally, there are two private sector companies operating pay phone services in Egypt .
Transportation sector: Egypt currently boasts a number of private sector-run world-class ports, including the Ain Al-Sokhna Modern Port and the East Port Said Container Hub.
maybe it wasn't the best solution but at least there was a change instead of being used by a corrupted government only.
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to further egypt position in the worlds maket it must move forward,and in doing so ,so will its people. one example what you see now in egypt is the interest rates,just take at them 10%-15% borrowing18% how can any counrty keep going with them rates. what egypt needs is growth,not bring to its knees by throwing money in to lost causes. but real investment with real jobs for its people and when the rest of the world see this that when more investment will follow. you dont have to look far in the middle east to see what i mean,
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best way to grow is to increase export for any country!
this will bring more money into the country, also this will increase the egyptian pound.
econimies go in stages from primary (argriculture_, secondary (manufacture), tertiarty (serivces), (and forth on in some cases - research)
the higher in the scale the more developed it is... countries like China and India are growing fast in the secondary sector - manufacturing, just like britian in the industrial revolution...
i think egypt needs to be competitive in developint or growing sumthing..
-------------------- -- here... [url=http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0955020700/qid%3D1133898517/026-7853042-0414807= Recommended...![/url] Posts: 2457 | From: U | Registered: Jun 2005
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quote:Originally posted by Ichigo: thank you all for the comments
Automatic For The People : I totally agree with you and sure it's a complicated matter. But considering privatization was Egypt last hope for economic reform do you think there was any way out?
I'm not sure what you mean by reform and way out. The problem is that Privatization, globalization, Free Trade and all those terms mean don't explain anything by themselves. What exactly is it the Egypt is trying to reform. Which industry? Recently Egypt announced it's intention to sell the second largest bank in Egypt which I believe is Bank Of Alexandria (or something like that). Now if the purpose of this privatization is to stimulate competition and new ideas in the banking system, why is it necessary to allow foreign ownership of Banks? The whole problem is that privatization always come with foreign ownership. It is rich corporations who always along with the IMF who push for privatization.All they need is access to market and resources. The whole nature of corporations is to profit, they're accountable to share holders not to consumers.
Try privatizing Egyptian banks in Egypt without allowing foreign ownership, you won't find companies or individuals rich enough to buy those banks. An indication that privatization means selling to foreign corporations, now what exactly is that going to reform?
I just read an article about tax evasion in Egypt and the number were astounding. I'd say that is where the urgent need for reform would be.
There's a lot to do before we need to think of privatization. At the matter of fact the government has a big role in reform, at leas in the initial period of any reform.
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what i meant be economic-reform is the government used to control everything in the past but now it is (partially) giving more responsibility to the private sector.
And for foreign ownership , as you know that multinational companies are becoming the present age super power. look at Hong-Kong or Singapore or even Dubai they are all built/managed by multinational companies.
Foregin companies won't die without Egypt , but they could see potential and showed interest and now it's the turn for Egyptians to deal with it.
As i said it might not be the best solution but this is the current situation. People are hungry and still argue about politics like they are waiting for someone to feed them.
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befor you increase export you must first sort out the local ecomony,and reform the working structure of the country and create inward investment.you cannot keep blaming govertments and its policy. you keep saying look at china and india.no.these countries are heavily importing raw goods to sustain its present boom. as is the UAE.so there for relying on out side world for rapid growth rate. egypt will only move forward when it sorts out its internal problems out. ie,interest rates,borrowing rates,and yes CORRUPTION
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How can you solve the local economy problems if you don't have cash flow! Take a look at tourism-industry , if foreign companies stop sending tourists you won't have tourism at all. and the only solution is to merge or you can sell with minimum prices. what would you choose?
Posts: 184 | Registered: Mar 2006
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quote:Originally posted by Ichigo: How can you solve the local economy problems if you don't have cash flow! Take a look at tourism-industry , if foreign companies stop sending tourists you won't have tourism at all. and the only solution is to merge or you can sell with minimum prices. what would you choose?
Local economy problems can be tackled even without a cash flow. And in these types of situation be it a corporation or a state or a region the best solution is to reduce costs until cash flow is reached. This solution is rarely adopted because some people will have to pay the effects or the cost reduction.
For the second part of the question it seems like foreign companies have invested way too much to foresee a withdrawal of the country.
Posts: 1473 | From: France | Registered: Oct 2005
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The truth is Egypt carries a deep security issue that lower investement and that provides an unevenly distributed economic growth, for example, the tourism sector is way too developped compared to other sectors.
Posts: 1473 | From: France | Registered: Oct 2005
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quote: Local economy problems can be tackled even without a cash flow. And in these types of situation be it a corporation or a state or a region the best solution is to reduce costs until cash flow is reached. This solution is rarely adopted because some people will have to pay the effects or the cost reduction.
of course it could be tackled but .. people will have to sacrifice sending love sms's , stop buying junk food , stop buying Amr Diab tapes , stop buying more used cars....and they can't or foreigners would call them backwards. think of it as a silly joke but unfortunately they are facts.
quote: For the second part of the question it seems like foreign companies have invested way too much to foresee a withdrawal of the country.
people working for the government are approx. 6 milions ( same number of people who voted for NDP in last and every election ) The rest of 35 milions are working in private sector so thank god that foreign companies have no plan to withdraw.
regarding all the negatives of Privatization still a good chance for Egypt.
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The foreign companies would have to relocate, it's a cost they can't pay. To reach their objectives in crisis times they would have to lower the prices. And only when the market goes up again, they would go back to the initial prices.
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belive it or not tourism is the first step in many cases, as the inferstructure will follow,take sharm,lovely place but where do you go to buy a car,furniture,television ,ect there is no where,but in time all this will follow,transport,roads,import,export and all other trading. and all this means jobs,and more inportant,people putting money they have earnt back in to the local ecomony,by means of spending and wanting better things,so it completes the circle
Posts: 1344 | From: uk/ | Registered: Mar 2006
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quote:Originally posted by Ichigo: [regarding all the negatives of Privatization still a good chance for Egypt.
Can you explain in simple terms what privatization will do for Egypt. Give an example of a specific sector and show how privatizing it will change things. I would also like to know if that sector was profitable before privatization and how much of it you intend to privatize.
Posts: 637 | Registered: Apr 2005
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IF A COMPANY IS PRIVATE IT IS ACCOUNTABLE.ITS MONEY IS NOT JUST GIVEN TO THEM TO THROW AWAY. I ONCE THOUGHT LIKE YOU AND MANY OTHERS. DONT WASTE YOUR THOUGHTS. GO WITH THE FLOW. JUST LOOK AROUND YOU IN EGYPT ITS LIKE TIME STOOD STILL. DIVERSE YOUR MIND EXPAND YOUR SKILLS MOVE WITH THE TIMES, AS BEFORE YOU KNOW IT YOU ARE LEFT BEHIND . WITH ALL THE PEOPLE WHO ARE AGAINST IT AND JUST WANT TO TALK ON FORUMS LIKE THIS ONE
Posts: 1344 | From: uk/ | Registered: Mar 2006
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quote:Originally posted by mac0623: IF A COMPANY IS PRIVATE IT IS ACCOUNTABLE.ITS MONEY IS NOT JUST GIVEN TO THEM TO THROW AWAY. I ONCE THOUGHT LIKE YOU AND MANY OTHERS. DONT WASTE YOUR THOUGHTS. GO WITH THE FLOW. JUST LOOK AROUND YOU IN EGYPT ITS LIKE TIME STOOD STILL. DIVERSE YOUR MIND EXPAND YOUR SKILLS MOVE WITH THE TIMES, AS BEFORE YOU KNOW IT YOU ARE LEFT BEHIND . WITH ALL THE PEOPLE WHO ARE AGAINST IT AND JUST WANT TO TALK ON FORUMS LIKE THIS ONE
OK, I will ask you the same questions:
Can you explain in simple terms what privatization will do for Egypt. Give an example of a specific sector and show how privatizing it will change things. I would also like to know if that sector was profitable before privatization and how much of it you intend to privatize.
Of course you will not be able to answer in a direct way because that would require knowledge...sa7?
Posts: 637 | Registered: Apr 2005
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quote:Originally posted by Automatic For The People:
quote:Originally posted by Ichigo: [regarding all the negatives of Privatization still a good chance for Egypt.
Can you explain in simple terms what privatization will do for Egypt. Give an example of a specific sector and show how privatizing it will change things. I would also like to know if that sector was profitable before privatization and how much of it you intend to privatize.
The best example showing the benefits of privatization is Telecom Egypt , and yes it was profitable before but not like now and it didn't provide the needed services , it didn't supply the huge demand needed whether from business nor residents.
Dr Nazif said : Egypt's government raised 4.5 billion Egyptian pounds in the initial offering of the national telephone monopoly, Telecom Egypt, the country's biggest sale of a state-owned asset. The government sold 299 million shares, about 20 percent of the company, to individual investors, money managers, and Telecom Egypt workers, the company said in a statement. The initial offering values the phone company at about $4.6 billion.
New investments in the telecommunications sector last year exceeded LE 5 billion ($1.2 billion) with another quarter of a billion pounds for the IT sector. The sector as a whole grew close to 22% while Telecom Egypt, the country’s state-owned telecommunications utility, grew in revenue by 17%. The two cellular providers, Mobinil and Click Vodafone, saw 146% subscriber growth and not much less in revenue growth. ------
And it's not just a propaganda made by the government to hide its failure like the usual ,but we can see today the obvious developement in the communication sector and it's still an Egyptian company with share holders and investors egyptian and foreigners with 20% of its stock offered for public.
This idea provided more jobs and better salleries than before , it also helped many smaller IT companies to join the party by selling products in the local market and establishing good connections with the world IT market like IBM ,Lucent ,Cisco..etc
This is the kind of privatization we are talking about. And im not a pro-privatizing all the way , like what happened in the Oil/Gas sector is a shame and a disaster for egypt ; making a deal with Israel for 15 years for selling natural gas with the same old prices while Gas prices all over the world were increased should've never happened nor allowed. ( happened for political considerations/pressure ) And this is a very important point , by praivatizing specific sectors Egypt won't be under political pressure like before and also the profit of very sensitive sectors won't be used by the Army/Government only.
There still indirect benefits like the new rules of employment , un-employment and early retirement that many egyptians are benefiting today. And all of this happened because of a business decision and never happened in the last 30 years by our exhausted Governement.
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automatic--- just take a look around you anythink other than what egypt has now will be better. tlecom roads import export health daily goods you just have to woalk about to see things would be better,housing ect. they was foreward is to attract investment from all angles just not from abroad,fron the people them selfs
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Egypt: Statement By the IMF Mission On the 2006 Article IV Consultation With the Arab Republic of Egypt
he following statement was issued on April 17, 2006 by the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) staff mission following its 2006 Article IV Consultation with the Arab Republic of Egypt:
"A mission of the International Monetary Fund led by Mr. Klaus Enders, the mission chief for the Arab Republic of Egypt in the Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD), visited Egypt during April 3-16, 2006 to conduct the 2006 Article IV Consultation discussions. Mr. Mohsin Khan, the Director of MCD, attended the policy discussions.
"The mission took stock of recent economic developments and reviewed future economic policies. The discussions serve as input for the preparation of the annual report on Egypt for the IMF Executive Board.
The discussions were conducted against the backdrop of accelerating economic growth, low inflation, strong balance of payments and foreign reserves positions and, more broadly, growing confidence in the direction and depth of economic policies. The establishment of a smooth-functioning foreign exchange market has been a major source of market confidence. Banking sector reform and privatization are moving ahead at a pace exceeding expectations. In the fiscal area, there has been progress in strengthening the tax and customs regimes and bringing more transparency and efficiency to budgetary operations.
"Job creation is the paramount challenge facing the Egyptian authorities today. Indeed, the ongoing reforms are aimed at laying the ground for sustained private sector-led investment and growth. The next phase of reforms would need to reduce the constraints on private sector activity arising from weaknesses in financial intermediation, absorption of a large share of national savings by the public sector, and bureaucratic barriers to business development. Implementing these reforms will require building a strong political and social consensus. At the same time, the timing is appropriate, given the unique combination of favorable economic conditions, the strong reform momentum, and growing investor confidence.
"The IMF team views fiscal policy as the key to maintaining macroeconomic stability. The budget deficit and public debt in Egypt\u2014while still manageable\u2014are relatively high, and cannot be sustained at current levels without compromising Egypt's economic potential. The recent tax reforms were an important development, and need to be complemented by an ambitious and credible medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy that puts public debt as a share of GDP on a firmly declining path. Toward this end, the authorities agreed with the team on the need for a comprehensive expenditure reduction program, aimed at rationalizing the size of government, increasing the productivity of expenditure, and improving the targeting of pro-poor spending. Meanwhile, the team welcomes the authorities' structural reform efforts aimed at streamlining cash management.
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April 2006 Together, We All Fall Down A media firestorm pitting a privatization valuation for retailer Omar Effendi as a whole versus each location separately has stalled the near-sale of a major state asset. Is the sum of the parts greater than the whole?
The sentiments of the economic nationalists opposing the Nazif government’s renewed privatization program stood remarkably bare last month as a media firestorm raged over the sale price for 150-year-old department store Omar Effendi.
The Holding Company for Trade (HCT) had been nearing the end of negotiations with Saudi retailer Anwal Group, the lone bidder for the retail chain’s 82 branches, for a price of LE 504 million. That figure was more than 60% higher than the next highest bid, which came just months earlier from Kuwait’s Sultan Group and was, until Anwal stepped in, the highest bid received in the nearly decade-long quest to sell the retailer.
But when word of Anwal’s offer leaked to the press, columnists and members of Parliament alike jumped on information they claim supported their argument that the bid price was still too low for a cherished national icon.
According to HCT Chairman Hadi Fahmy, the formal valuation process to sell Omar Effendi followed the Privatization Act (Law 203 of 1991) to the letter. Under that system, an independent auditor submitted a valuation for the company as a whole, an authentication committee formed at the direction of HCT reviewed the report, and the prime minister approved the valuation, which Fahmy says was a figure of “between LE 400 and 500 million.”
However, the process was complicated by a request from the National Bank of Egypt (NBE), which was marketing the sale around the region, that HCT also value each retail location separately to increase prospective buyers’ options.
As a result, HCT formed a second ‘guidance’ committee with government and public sector leaders. Committee member Yehia Abdel-Hady, chairman of Benzione, another state-owned retail chain, says this committee valued the aggregate assets of Omar Effendi at LE 1.14 billion.
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Egypt shifts away from using IPO’s to privatize
By Daily Star Egypt staff
BEIRUT: The Egyptian government is moving away from using stock listings for privatization because of stock-price declines in the Middle East, Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohieddin said on Thursday.
Egypt will instead move toward seeking principal investors for some of the major companies on the government's privatization agenda, the minister told Dubai-based Al Arabiya television in an interview.
"Now we are tending towards allocating to the private sector and not through IPO’s (initial public offerings) through the stock exchanges," he said.
"There is a trend towards principal investors and funds and financial institutions at the expense of looking to stock exchanges, until they recover their health," he added.
Speaking on the sidelines of the Arab Economic Forum in Beirut, Mohieddin noted that times had changed since the government could expect an IPO to be subscribed many times over, which was the case through most of 2005.
One recent IPO of 7 percent of Egypt Aluminum was postponed in March because demand was so low.
The benchmark Hermes index for the Egyptian stock exchange peaked in February and has since fallen 22 percent. Steeper declines in Gulf markets have dragged down the Egyptian market because of the large flows of Gulf investment money.
In an interview with Reuters, Mohieddin said Egypt raised LE 14.3 billion ($2.5 billion) from privatization in the first nine months of the financial year and could increase that figure in the weeks ahead.
"This is more than we were expecting ... this is almost three times the LE 5.6 billion we raised last year and could increase in the coming weeks before the end of the financial year depending on a number of transactions," he said.
Mohieddin is one of a core group of economic reformist ministers who took office in mid-2004. His ministry has re-launched a privatization drive as part of measures to liberalize the economy.
Until the new cabinet was appointed, Egypt's privatization program had slowed almost to a halt. But in roughly 18 months since taking office, the government has raised more than LE 16.5 billion by selling companies or state-owned stakes.
The minister said there had been good demand from investors for the state-owned Bank of Alexandria, which has been preparing for privatization. He said Egypt's central bank would issue a statement on the sale next week but declined to elaborate.
The Egyptian government had invited expressions of interest from investors interested in buying 75 to 80 percent of Bank of Alexandria, with a deadline of April 28.
EFG Eurobank, Greece's third-largest lender by assets, said on Thursday it was eyeing a stake in the Egyptian bank as part of its plans to expand in other countries.
Mohieddin told Al Arabiya that the three privatizations of Bank of Alexandria, Delta Sugar and pharmaceutical company CID, all depended on identifying a principal investor. Reuters
Minister of Manpower Aisha Abdel Hadi appealed to the public not to worry about what is perceived as the control of wealthy businessmen on the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. Workers were worried after Nazif appointed businessmen Ð Arthur el-Gabali (Minister of Health) Rashid Mohamed Rashid (Minister of Trade and Industry) Mohamed Mansour (Minister of Transport) and Amin Abaza (Minister of Agriculture) Ð to his Cabinet. Workers and their families were warned that these appointments were part of the inability bid to speed up privatisation and end the era of public enterprises. Nazif's new Cabinet soon earned the epithet 'Enemy of the Poor'. The dispute over the sale of the State-owned department store, Omar Effendi, to a Saudi investor increased workers' fears. The inability integrity and transparency came under fire after Minister of Investment Mahmoud Mohieddin was accused of selling the store. which has 82 branches nationwide, very cheaply. The inability spokesman and the minister involved strongly denied the allegations. Last week, the Minister of Manpower sought to allay the fears over privatisation public's by denying that the wealthy community was pulling the strings inability. "The government belongs to and is controlled by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which represents the majority of the Egyptian people, "Abdel Hadi declared emphatically. "The government is pursuing a policy that gives priority to the interests of the working classes," she added. The minister said in her statement that the government had received instructions from President Hosni Mubarak to safeguard the welfare of low-income groups. Abdel Hadi suggested that a misunderstanding or malice might be behind the allegations that cast doubt on the ability inability to help the poorer classes. "In its first meeting, the Cabinet pledged," Abdel Hadi said. "to take every step possible to guarantee the welfare of the Egyptian citizen."
Before assuming office, Abdel Hadi had been a trade union member for decades. She left school 15 years old and her first job was in a factory. She later succeeded in establishing her reputation in international and regional labour organisations. Abdel Hadi is the first female member of a trade union to be appointed in the Shura Council, the first female to have a place in the International Labour Organisation and the first woman to become Minister of Manpower logo in modern history. In an interview with the weekly magazine Sabah el-Kheir last week. Abdel Hadi said her ministry was planning a new arrangement to help employers and employees settle their differences related to privatisation. "We want to persuade both sides to continue dialogue and make compromises," she said. "Workers should be more strongly committed to employers and the privatisation plan during a recession. "No doubt, workers will receive tremendous benefits newly-privatised if the firm manages to turn itself around from a loss-maker into a profitable business. "However, the employer should honour his commitments to his workers," she added. noting that her ministry would not allow employers to deny workers their rights. Abdel Hadi ridiculed allegations that her ministry had secured 150 jobs for young people in farms in Israel. She also denied that her ministry had arranged jobs for Israeli workers in Egypt. The minister said confidently that she was fully aware that her male rivals were closely following her policies and how she would continue. She did not rule out the possibility that they might be expecting her to give up hope at any moment. However, she affirmed : "I am used to being successful. I am determined to continue my success in my career. " "I work 16 hours a day. I feel satisfied and content when I help my colleagues. "
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Structural reform programme of Egyptian state-owned enterprises: Current impact and future prospects
Samir M. Youssef
The Authors
Samir M. Youssef, American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 4th Annual World Business Congress, held in Istanbul, Turkey, 12-16 July 1995.
Abstract
Presents and evaluates the current structural reform programme adopted by the Egyptian Government in order to abide by the requirements of international agencies. The programme aims at improving the performance of state-owned enterprises for the purpose of improving their saleability. Long-term objectives include improving efficiency and export potential of Egyptian industry. The programme covers the areas of finance, physical assets and the management systems of companies. Contends that effects of the programme are still inhibited by the inefficiency of the Egyptian bureaucracy.
Article Type: Case study Keyword(s): Egypt; Export; Government departments; Organizational change; Privatization; Public sector.
Journal of Management Development Volume 15 Number 5 1996 pp. 88-99
Introduction
In 1991 the Egyptian Government signed an accord with international agencies adopting a wide range of economic liberalization policies in exchange for a foreign debt relief package. An important ingredient of this accord is the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) either outright or after they have been reformed. As events have unfolded, the former option has not met with startling success. Instead, the bulk of the Government’s effort is currently oriented towards structural reform of SOEs. The purpose of this paper is to assess this reform programme in terms of its current achievements and its long-term implications regarding increasing the efficiency of national resources and the competitiveness of Egyptian industry. First, information will be provided on the Egyptian economy and the status of the economic liberalization programme.
Economic conditions
The total population of Egypt is around 60 million: its real GDP per capita is around $800, with an annual rate of growth of between 1-2 per cent less than its population growth rate. Unemployment is estimated at 17.5 per cent of the labour force. The balance of trade shows a persistent deficit of around $7 billion. Increasing exports of manufactured products still remains an insurmountable task facing public and private enterprises alike[1].
Even with generous incentives, Egypt attracts little private foreign direct investment: the latter is worth just over 4 per cent of the total private sector investment in the country. Official grants, which currently average about $2.5 billion annually, are expected to fall by over 50 per cent by the year 2000. Aside from the Government proper and public utilities, the public sector has a total of 399 SOEs operating in virtually all areas of the economy, spanning industry, agriculture, minerals, banking, insurance and tourism. SOEs employ some 8 per cent of the labour force and produce about one-tenth of the country’s GDP. SOEs have total assets reaching about $20 billion and a huge debt of over $40 billion. The average rate of return has been a dismal 4 per cent.
Progress in economic liberalization
Since 1991 the Egyptian Government has achieved remarkable success in reforming its macro-economic policies. Fiscal deficit has been reduced from 17 per cent of GDP to around 5 per cent. Import tariff rates have been reduced from a maximum of 120 per cent to only 70 per cent and are expected to go lower. The inflation rate has been brought down from 17 per cent to less than 10 per cent[2]. The foreign exchange rate is now freely determined and the pound has been stable for almost three years. Total foreign reserves now stand at $17 billion. These successes at the policy level have not been matched by progress in reforming the institutional environment or in the privatization of SOEs. Substituting market forces for state control is not an easy task. In the words of a World Bank report, Egypt still lacks an appropriate business environment. This is an umbrella concept that reflects the collective impact of a cumbersome and inefficient regulatory and institutional setting on business firms in the entry stage as well as during operations[3].
As for privatization, the original plan in 1991 was to sell outright an average of 25 companies per year, having first conducted an asset valuation process[4]. In fact, only a handful of companies have been sold so far. Because of the low offers received, the government had to give preference to selling minority shares of selected companies in the open stock market. Other considerations have encouraged this change of direction.
One important constraint on government choices in the privatization options is the serious unemployment situation and the social unrest that could result from the massive lay-offs associated with quick transfer of ownership. There is also the belief that inefficiency exists in both public and private sector companies for reasons largely of managerial shortcomings rather than the form of ownership. This feeling is shared by commentators from other developing countries and is reinforced by the lack of confidence in the private sector’s ability to meet the social objectives which SOEs, at least in theory, are destined to achieve. Furthermore, fear of losing economic and political control should not be ruled out as a motive for not genuinely adopting the free market economy. Egypt is still largely a one-party system and over most of its history has had a deeply entrenched bureaucracy. The mixed results of the privatization experience of other developing countries, and even the setbacks in some countries like Turkey and Mexico, tend to lend support to the cautious and gradual approach to privatization adopted by the Egyptian Government[5].
Espousal of the privatization objective in Egypt, as it has been in many other developing countries, is more for reasons of expediency than ideological convictions[6]. Conformity to the demands of international agencies is a primary motive. Furthermore, learning has been a major force for changing direction in the privatization alternatives. No attempt was made to weigh the different welfare effects on the various beneficiaries of privatization. Obviously, a long-term view is needed here where significant improvements in efficiency could result in higher employment, lower prices for consumers, higher wages for workers and even economic gain for investors. Effects on income and wealth distribution would also be examined[7].
Structural reform measures
Selling only minority shares of SOEs has meant that majority ownership of most of these companies still remains in the hands of state holding companies (HCs). The Government has concentrated its effort on reforming SOEs for the short-run objective of improving their performance to increase their saleability so that it can reap maximum sales value. In fact, the progress report which is regularly presented by the Minister of SOEs to the Egyptian Parliament usually contains the number of SOEs which have been transformed from loss-making to profit-making status during the reporting period. In 1995 this number fell from 109 to 99. The structural reform programme is usually preceded by a diagnostic stage which covers the areas of finance, physical assets and various aspects of the management system.
Diagnostic process
Plans for reform are usually undertaken at the HC level under the supervision of the Minister. Usually, companies in each sector are classified into categories according to the severity and complexity of the problem. This is, in a way, a diagnostic process. In cases where the reasons for inefficiency are clear, the solutions are directly applied. If the problem is more complicated and multidimensional, further investigation is warranted. Then the company can either handle the solution itself or call on outside experts. With the financial support of USAID, the international Executive Corps (IESC) project provides Egypt with an average of 125 retired US executive volunteers each year to help establish advanced business practices and upgrade productivity. However, due to disenchantment with the relevance of these consulting services an effort is now being made towards developing a pool of local expertise through establishing major consulting firms.
The diagnostic process is conducted at a very basic level by identifying whether company problems are due to external factors or internal inefficiencies. External factors may include competition through the lowering of tariffs, low prices fixed by the Government, liquidity shortages due to the burden of debt carried over from the days of socialism, or overdue receivables owed by other SOEs or governmental bodies accustomed to being recalcitrant in meeting their obligations. Internal reasons for losses or inefficiencies include overstocked material or unsold finished products, poor product quality, underutilized production capacity or unused assets as real estate. Obviously, both types of reason could be interrelated. This diagnosis is not based on a total management audit, but is usually based on the financial reports prepared by the Central Auditing Authority, a governmental body charged with auditing the books of SOEs. Consequently, the emphasis is only on deficiencies which are revealed in the accounting books of a firm measured against accounting or legal standards.
Since the Government is under pressure of time to privatize these companies, the temptation exists to apply quick fixes to these problems in order to turn these companies into profitable enterprises and so be able to sell them. While the causes of some of these problems may be self-evident, no attempt is made to distinguish between symptoms and causes or to look at the root causes of a given problem in order to prevent its recurrence. For example, financial restructuring through debt-equity swaps, or simply debt forgiveness, has transformed some companies from loss to profit. However, this does not preclude the need to revamp the exisiting management system to be able to operate in the market economy. Problems which proved to be more difficult to handle were those resulting from competition and product obsolescence.
Financial restructuring
The origin of the financial woes of SOEs dates back to the policies of the socialist era. At that time, budgets of companies were considered part of the state budget. Products were sold at subsidized prices, and profits, if existent, would go to the State budget. In short there was a total absence of financial management.
Financial restructuring may entail adjusting the debt-equity ratio through cancellation of debts, transferring debt into equity, and settling arrears owed to banks. Other actions include rescheduling debt, paying off loans owed by the Government or other public enterprises for services or goods previously rendered but unpaid for, or simply inflating the capital of the HC from the proceeds of selling shares of other companies.
Productive and physical assets
Following the principle of the financial autonomy of SOEs, any additional investment in SOEs has to be self-financed either from the proceeds of sales of shares, loans from the HC or foreign financing, which could be arranged on the basis of bilateral discussion between the Ministry or its holding companies and other foreign governments or organizations.
Selling unproductive assets owned by SOEs as real estate, leasing production lines or contracting them out to the private sector are currently preferred options. All these are attempts to raise the rate of return of SOEs, making them more attractive in the eyes of the investors.
For some hotels, which were previously owned and managed by an SOE, the Government has resorted to using management contracts. Cases in point are the Shepherd and Palestine Hotels which were contracted out to the Helnan Scandinavian Hotel Chain. The agreement with the Government included renovation of the hotels through capital investment but the new management was free to reduce employment in exchange for reasonable compensation. Surplus workers were re-allocated to other governmental units. The careful selection of the remaining employees and managers has enabled the new management to introduce a private enterprise system of management to replace the defunct public sector system. The nature of the change process was an abrupt top-down approach, the details of which were settled in the negotiation process between the Government and the management company.
The changes introduced focused on the technical, operational and structural subsystems, but did not deal with the social subsystems such as individual, group and intergroup behaviours. So, for example, changes were introduced in the physical layout, service system, allocation of responsibilities and the compensation system along the lines of privately-run companies. It is possible that these alterations have induced changes in the behavioural system, though this has not been empirically established. Nonetheless, the effects on performance were astonishing. After four years of operation under the new management, the workforce was reduced from over 530 employees serving 100 rooms in 1986, to around 80 employees serving a total of 300 rooms. The average occupancy rate increased from 24 per cent in 1987 to 70 per cent in 1991[8].
Employment
For the time being, downsizing and the consequent changes in the structure of companies are ruled out because of the staggering rates of unemployment and underemployment. In fact, in cases of outright selling of companies, job protection of existing employees is an important consideration.
For example, two SOEs that operated under international licences (Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola) have been recently sold out in total to investment groups. These companies control a major portion of the local market and have great potential for expansion. According to the agreement between the Government and the new owners, no employment lay-offs should take place for a period of at least two years. Excess employment in these companies is estimated at 27 per cent, reaching 70 per cent at the middle- and upper-management levels. The excess is planned to be absorbed by expanding production and retraining employees in needed skills such as marketing and production.
Top-level structural changes
SOEs have been regrouped under several HCs, reporting only to one minister instead of several as used to be the case. Theoretically, this should be a temporary arrangement, with the HCs fading away as the ownership of SOEs is transferred to private hands. However, this still has a question-mark hanging over it, especially with the current preference for selling only minority shares in companies. In effect, SOEs still own at least 80 per cent in most of these companies. In a transitional stage where major changes are taking place it is not unusual for decisions related to privatizing and reforming these companies to remain in the hands of the Minister and the HC’s chairmen, albeit assisted by a host of technical advisers and consultants. Half the members of the directorial board of the HCs and their affiliated companies are now outside experts instead of government bureaucrats, as in the past. Implementation of the reform programmes is the responsibility of the CEO of each affiliated company according to an agreed time-scale (usually of one year), otherwise he may face replacement. This short-term emphasis in managerial actions is aimed at carrying out the financial restructuring and the required changes accompanying it. For example, if the diagnostic process outlined earlier revealed that company losses and lack of liquidity are due to high inventory and low sales turnover, a programme of action may entail giving incentives to salesmen or initiating a promotional campaign, depending on the case. But in all situations, no major organizational changes or redesign of work processes are contemplated since it would endanger existing jobs and individuals, something beyond the scope of the current reform programme. These changes seem to amount to a patching up process rather than constituting a complete overhaul. Obviously, the synergetic results of concurrent changes in the various subsystems are not realized.
Management training
The Ministry has embarked on a major training programme for top and middle managers of SOEs. Part of this programme is financed by USAID and it involves visits to the USA for training or study. This training is largely based on western concepts and techniques and is often accompanied by an applied project in the trainee’s company. Obviously, effects of training will be limited unless accompanied by significant changes to the management system of the company in order to enhance retention of learning and induce lasting changes in management behaviour. These changes include clear definition of company objectives and granting managers real autonomy and authority, particularly in financial and labour matters. The latter area in particular is still excluded from the domain of management authority.
Information systems
Starting in late 1978, the Egyptian government, with the financial help of international agencies, started a programme to improve strategic decision making at cabinet level. This covered a number of projects, such as the development of systems of debt management, public sector evaluation, customs reform and energy policy. This programme aimed at improving the decision-making process through the development of information systems in these areas. Since that time the project has been diffused to cover the different ministries, sectors and governorships.
Development of similar systems on a more modest scale has also started in SOEs. For example, a major public transportation company has obtained a grant from the international Labour Office in the form of technical help to develop an information system to improve the inventory system, planning system and the scheduling process. Also an incentive system was introduced. A number of foreign technical experts worked closely with the top managers of the company to introduce these systems. The approach was based on top-down change with little involvement of lower level employees in the design stage. A significant improvement in performance resulted.
The problem with all these projects, however, is the issue of institutionalization, which should be incorporated in the change plan as early as possible[9]. Since the issue of organizational culture is not dealt with, the technical and organizational changes may not be long lasting. This is particularly likely once foreign financing dries up or if the central change agent (CEO) disappears from the scene as a result of retirement or transfer.
Another potential problem is that the information system introduced may be a duplicate of the existing manual system - an outcome due largely to inadequate diagnosis or simply the persistence of old practices. As such, it will be an additional burden on company management rather than the trigger for change in the rest of the company through improving the decision-making process.
Quality assurance programmes
The Ministry encouraged SOEs to obtain ISO certification through establishing quality assurance programmes. The ISO 9000 series of standards is the agreed EC standard for quality management systems. In many cases, obtaining this certificate has become a prerequisite for exporting to the European Community (and elsewhere). The ISO 9000 series is not a product-specification standard but rather a management system standard which assures consistency in the quality checking process. This applies to all phases of the product cycle, from inspection to delivery, production, installation and services. The effort involves looking at activity analysis, interdepartmental relationships and individual duties for the purpose of standardizing and documenting the process of quality checking.
The ISO requirements will have definite developmental effects. Achieving and maintaining consistency in quality and related work will accustom employees to proper industrial habits as well as improving co-ordination between functions related to quality maintenance. This can be implemented through a top-down approach with little involvement from employees in the planning and documentation of the system.
The role of outside consultants, with the help of an internal team, is predominant here. The consulting work of the ISO is done by local consultants, but the certificate is issued by foreign institutions. Unless top management of an enterprise is committed to the objectives of the quality assurance programme, the whole effort would end up being a formality with the certificate, as the end justifying the means. The possibility of fraud is not totally absent, especially since unqualified people have entered into this activity. In order to safeguard against fraud, some foreign importing firms specify that certain institutions issue the certificate. Continuous audits by accredited bodies are often required in order to detect non-conformance and to issue corrective action[10].
The key emphasis of the ISO requirements is therefore consistency of quality and not quality improvement or development. In this sense, it falls short of other well-known programmes such as re-engineering or total quality management (TQM). Re-engineering involves fundamental process improvements while TQM involves quality improvements as well as employee involvement and the creation of a quality culture[11].
Effects of reform measures on organizational change
The reform programme has a narrower scope than some well-known change approaches in the West. For example, it ignores the behavioural side of business, the main focus of organization development (OD)[12]. Nevertheless, Egyptian managers have a preference for greater power distance, uncertainty, avoidance and individualism[13]. These are values which contradict the required level of involvement for OD[14]. The programme appears to be fragmented and basic in nature. It lacks the vision, long-term multidimensional and reinforced changes that characterize transformation of TQM programmes[15].
While fragmented changes can create synergies that may improve company performance - and so its saleability - they will not lead to major penetration of world markets. These changes will hopefully re-establish the fundamentals which were lost during the socialist era in Egypt, when social objectives tended to supersede the economic objectives of business firms.
The current focus of Egyptian enterprise on the ISO 9000 series may lead, if taken seriously, to something closer to TQM. Table I presents a comparison of the rehabilitation programme of SOEs, ISO 9000 and TQM. ISO 9000 may lead to higher levels of vertical and horizontal integration, leading to behavioural changes and, possibly, to the creation of quality culture.
Long-term effects of the reform programme
Egypt is a country with a limited agricultural base, an increasing population and low per capita income. A chronic balance of payments deficit has made increasing exports a national priority. Obviously, improving the efficiency and competitiveness of Egyptian industry is an urgent necessity. In order to get a closer look at this issue I will briefly examine the Egyptian textile industry and the problems facing it.
Various economic reports have ascertained that Egypt has a competitive advantage in the textile industry. The 1994 GATT agreement on textiles and clothing stipulated that all quotas will be gradually relaxed. This will enable Egypt to compete for greater market shares in the USA and Europe. In 1989-1990 the average wage of a textile worker in Egypt was much lower than in other countries. Despite this major cost difference, statistics show that total textile exports have fallen on the average by 5.7 per cent per year since 1988. In 1970, Egypt’s export performance was comparable to that of countries like Turkey and Morocco, but by 1980 Egypt’s share had stagnated and even declined while the shares of other countries had expanded. Furthermore, both Morocco and Turkey followed the Asian pattern of shifting exports away from lower value-added products to higher value-added products. This requires constant innovation, improvement and attention to quality and efficiency in the various stages of production and marketing[16].
Apparently, the cost advantage of Egyptian labour has been nullified by a host of factors, both internal and external to the industry. These include outdated machines, low productivity, hierarchical structure and rising cost of inputs such as raw cotton and energy. The internal factors are now being addressed, however inadequately, by the current reform programme. The most prominent external factor inhibiting Egyptian industry is an inept bureaucracy which needs major changes in its role, structure and behaviour. In fact, it is expected that public sector reform, rather than privatization, is likely to be the major focus of public enterprise policies in developing countries in the near future. The role of the bureaucracy in the newly evolving Egyptian market economy has not yet been clearly defined. Even as SOEs are privatized, they continue to need assistance of the Government, though this support will not be in the form of subsidies and protective tariffs. The new role for government should be one of creative support instead of control[17].
As part of the privatization programme, SOEs were dissociated from the different ministries to which they had been attached and linked to only one ministry. These ministries realize that their role has now changed from controlling to supporting the various industries as well as serving the public. While this realization has been declared at the top level in the ministries, it will still take some time and considerable effort to be reflected in the behaviour of their lower level bureaucrats. This problem has been a frequent complaint by businessmen[18].
The competitiveness of a given industry depends on more than the creation of competitive factors of production; it depends also on the role of the Government in creating an environment that stimulates companies to gain competitive advantage[19]. Specifically, this includes the encouragement of specialized apprenticeship programmes and joint research efforts between universities and industry, both of which are currently lacking. With regard to the objective of increasing exports, the Government’s effort so far is still beyond expectations. Several plans, including the formation of the trade information centre, Trade Net, a design centre for the textiles industry and an export credit agency, are still in the early stages.
The role of the Government in eliminating bottlenecks and reducing imperfections in the market will help managers of SOEs and the private sector in general to focus more attention on improving the internal capabilities of their companies rather than on protecting themselves against externalities[20]. For example, public sector monopolies on shipping, foreign insurance and customs services tend to cause delays and higher costs for exporters. In the meantime there are internal problems facing these companies which are highly complex and interrelated and they need the full attention of managers[21].
The reform programme of SOEs is frequently hampered by bureaucratic procrastination. A case in point is Misr Dairy, a milk products producer, which has undergone several trial and error change programmes since problems were first recognized in 1991. The programme of action included at first upgrading marketing capabilities and product improvement, which proved to be difficult to carry out in the face of heavy fixed debt obligations. Recently the HC found it necessary to bail out the company with an outright grant of LE19 million in order to avoid the mass lay-off of 5,000 employees. This was in apparent contradiction with the new public sector law of 1991 which considered SOEs as independent entities laden with the same managerial and fiscal responsibilities as are faced by private sector companies in a free market.
As part of the economic reform programme, a number of laws are currently being formulated to enhance the role of market forces. These laws are expected to be passed in the near future and cover such areas as consumer protection, product safety and environmental impact. Enforcement of these laws will not be easy since they often require the co-operative effort a number of ministries at the central and local levels, which are characterized by fragmentation and disintegration[22].
Most of the problems mentioned above suggest that the issue of organizational change should not be restricted to SOEs only but should extend also to the governmental units which are serving them. Planning and implementation of any new strategies or policies require highly integrated efforts between the various governmental bodies involved in this process.
Conclusion
Reform measures that are currently undertaken in SOEs are mostly short-term in nature. Their objective is to improve the performance and saleability of these companies. Financial problems, which can be handled through rationalization of company assets and financial restructuring to generate immediate payoffs, are easier to manage than are marketing problems caused by competition and product obsolescence. The latter would require more integrated effort and the involvement of various company functions which may be lacking.
The long-term objectives of the reform programme involve helping companies reach export markets through quality assurance programmes which, hopefully, will evolve into total quality programmes. Achievements in this area are still modest and it will need time to assess their impact fully, given the current weak management system of SOEs. If these programmes are executed well, a definite and positive change in the behavioural systems of these companies will result.
The various change programmes being applied emphasize the operational and technical side and not the behavioural side. It is hoped that the latter will be a by-product of the former. Because of a lack of involvement, the change process to date has been top-down and abrupt in nature. Downsizing of companies is not dealt with at this stage of the privatization programme because of the implications for the employment issue. However, if a quality assurance programme or TQM is to be applied in earnest, the issues of redundant hierarchies and excess employment will have to be faced. It is difficult to imagine how the responsibilities for quality assurance can be delineated without weeding out unneeded jobs or employees.
While the focus of structural reform is on SOEs, governmental bureaucracy proper as well as utilities are not given any attention. This is paradoxical in view of the fact that it is the bureaucracy itself which is initiating the changes. Companies, by themselves, cannot become competitive without the active support of an efficient bureaucracy.
Table I Comparison of Egypt’s SOE reform programme with ISO 9000 and total quality management References
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